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Report on tbe causes of, and circumstances attending, the 
explosion which occurred at Easington Colliery, County Durham, 
on the 29th May, 1951 
The Right Honourable Geoffrey Llo)'d, M.P., 
Minister of Fllel and Power. 
SIR, 
1.-1NTRODCCTORY 
31s( July, 1952. 
10 accordance with the direction of your predecessor, the Right Honourable 
Philip Noel�Baker, M.P., I held a forma! Investigation under the provisions 
of Section 83 of the Coal Mines Act, 191 1 , into the causes and circumstances 
of the Explosion which occurred at Easington Colliery, County Durham, 
on 29th May, 1 951. 
I now have the honour to submit the following Report, which shows that 
firedamp was ignited when the picks of a coal cutting machine operating on a 
retreating longwall face struck pyrites. The explosion spread through 1 6,000 
yards of roadway and caused the deaths of 8 1  persons. Two persons died in 
the ensuing rescue operations. 
The Inquiry was opened at the Easington Colliery Welfare Hall, E..'lSinglon. 
on 30lh October and terminated on 1 5th November. Evidence was taken on 
1 3  days and 75 witnesses were examined. A list of these witnesses is given i n  
Appendix 11. 
The appearances were as follows :-
For Ministry of Fuel and Power 
Mr. T. A. lones, O.B.E., H.M. Divisional Inspector of Mines. 
Mr. l. Cowan, H.M. Principal Electrical Inspector of Mines. 
Mr. A. H. A. Wynn, Director of the Safety in Mines Research Establish­
ment. 
For National Coal Board 
Mr. W. L. Miron, 0.8.E., T.D., Secretary, East Midlands Division. 
Mr. W. F. Richardson, Chief Safety Engineer, Headquarters. 
For National Union of Mineworkers 
Mr. S. WatsoD, C.B.E., General Secretary, Durham Area. 
Mr. R. W. WiUiams, M.P. 
Mr. C. Robinson, Chairman, Easington Miners' Lodge. 
For National Association of Colliery Overmen, Deputies and Shotjirers 
Mr. B. Walsh, l.P., President. 
Mr. J. Crawford. General Secretary. Durham Area. 
For British Association 0/ Colliery Management 
Mr. R. W. Anderson, M.C. 
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For National Association of Colliery Managers 
Mr. Robert Williams. 
Professor I .  C. F. Stalham. 
For Association of ft1;II;ng Electrical alld .\,/ec/wl/ical Engineers 
Mr. H. Brocklesby. Vice PTesident. 
For Federatioll of Small Mines 0/ Great Britain 
Mr. T. S. Nicholson, Chairman } 
'-1 EC K d S 
Durham Association of Small Mines. 
IV r. � . . cone y. ecrctar) 
For Northern Collier), Officials amI Stags' Association 
Mr. C. Whiteley. 
For Durham Colliery NleclulIIics' Association 
Mr. T. Murray. • 
H.-GENERAL 
EasinglOn Colliery is situated on the coast in the County of Durham, between 
the POrlS of Seaham Harbour and \Vesl Hartlepool, nine miles north-west of 
the latter. There are two principal shafts, both circular and both 20 feet in 
diameter. The North Shaft, the downcast, was sunk to the HUltO" Seam at 
a depth of 1 ,430 feet, the present winding level being 31 the Main Coal rnset at 
a depth of 1 ,130 feet. The South Shaft, the upcast, is 1,500 feet deep to the 
Hutton Seam. Both are used for winding men, mineral and materials. A third 
shaft, the West, 470 feet deep, is connected to the South Shaft by a drift at the 
164 fect level. Although sinking was started in 1899, coal drawing did nOI 
begin until 1910 because of difficulties encountered in passing through waler­
bearing strata. 
Management 
The mine was one of eight forming the No. 3 Area of the Durham Division 
of the National Coal Board. The principal officials were:-
Area General Manager Mr. F. W. Fry 
Area Production Manager Mr. J. P. Hall 
GToup Agent . .  . . Mr. T. N. Sneddon 
Assistant Agent 
Manager 
Undermanager- orth Pit 
Undermanager-South Pit 
. .  
. . 
. . Mr. H .  E. Morgan 
Mr. T. Hopkins 
Mr. H. E. Emery 
Mr. A. Carr 
Output and Persons Emplo)cd 
At the time of the disaster 2,235 persons were employed underground and 
652 on the surface. The average daily output was 3,600 tons. 
As is common in Durham mines, there were three production shifts, the fore­
shift, which Lasted from 3.30 a.m. to 1 J .07 a.m. , the back-sruft. from 9.45 a.m. 
to 5.22 p.m. , and the night-snin, from 4.0 p.m. to 1 1 .37 p.m. In addition to 
these main shifts a repair shift known as the stone-shift, consisting mainly of 
stone workers and coal cutter operators , descended at 10.0 p.m. and ascended 
at 5.37 a.m. 
4 
Seams \Yorked aDd Method of \Yorking 
The workable seams, in descending order, are tbe Fi\ e Quarter, Seven Quarter. 
Main Coal. Low Main and HuttOD. Before the explosion there were 14 pro­
ducing districts in the North Pit, of which five were in the Five Quarter, two 
in the Seven Quarter and seven in the Low Main Seam. 
Bard and pillar was tbe usual method of working, the pillars being 
formed by arcwall heading and extracted by lifts worked with the aid of either 
pneumatic picks or arcwall machines. Longwall, both advancing and retreating, 
was also practised. 
Thc Duckbill District 
The explosion occurred in tbe Five Quarter Seam, in the New or West 
District, more popularly known as the Duckbill District, the name that J shall 
use throughout this Report. 1t lies to the north-west of the shafts and north 
of an area reserved for the protection of the colliery village. 
At the shaft the Five Quarter Seam, including three banJs of stone totalling 
13 inches, is six feet two inches thick, the roof is of shale seven feet thick, 
with laminated sandstone and sandy shale above, and the floor is of clay one 
foot two inches thick, followed by about seven feet of alternate bands of coal 
and clay. Tn the Duckbill District the seam is about six feet ten inches thjck, 
the shale is thicker than at the shaft and the floor is fairly hard. The seam is 
some 1,050 feel deep and it dips at I in 32 to the north-east. A sample of the 
coal taken near to the entrance of the district gave a volatile content of 34.9 per 
cent. on a dry ash free basis. 
From the downcast shaft, as shown in Plan No .. I, the main haulage road and 
intake airway extends in the Main Coal Seam for 380 yards to tbe north and 
then for 640 yards along a road known as the West Level. At this point a 
stone drift rises at one in six to the north and, passing through the Seven 
Quarter Seam, enters the Five Quarter Seam. The return airway follows a 
similar, though more circuitous course, including two short drifts at an inclina­
tion of one in two, to the Five Quarter Seam. The West Level and its com­
panion roads in the Main Coal Seam continue for some 600 yards beyond the 
drifts. No coal was being worked in this area but it was used for training new 
entrants and was therefore known as the Training Section. 
In the Five Quarter Seam from the top of the drifrs, three roads, known as 
the Straight North places, with connecting stentons, continue to the north. 
From them, at about 200 yards from the top of the drifts, three roads, known 
as the First West Materials, Belt and Return roads, branch off and, still further 
to the north, are the roads formjng the Second and Third West areas. From 
the Second West roads, a small area was formed into pillars which were then 
extracted. The Third West places were open but not working at the time of 
the explosion. It was from the First West Roads that the area chiefly affected 
was developed. 
Up to the introduction of duckbill mach.inery in 1948, all these roads were 
driven by arcwall machines, the coal being blasted down and filled into tubs. 
The First South places were then driven, using duckbill loaders, into the 
reserved area. Pillars were formed but faulted ground curtailed further 
development. Full extraction was then attempted in the unreserved part, 
firstly by lifts off the pillars, and then by a modified form of longwall retreating, 
using the duckbill loaders. As neither method was completely successful, it 
was decided to use duckbill machines for winning out retreating longwall faces 
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to be worked by the conventional method of machine cUlling, blasting and 
hand-filling on to conveyors. The Second South and Third South headings 
were driven in accordance with this decision. 
The Second South headings, having been driven their full distance in readiness 
for the opening of a longwaU face, were temporarily idle at the time of the 
explosion. 
The Third South retreating face had been won out by two headings driven 
southwards off the First West Materials Road. Originally the headings had 
been set ofT 1 40 yards apart and the intention was to keep them parallel so as 
to form a face of that length, but the heading which afterwards became the 
return struck a fault and was turned inwards to avoid crossing it. Thus the 
two headings converged slightly, and the heading joining them to stan the 
longwall face was 90 yards long. The longwall face began 10 retreat, by means 
of maclline cuts four feet six inches deep, on 12th April. It had been decided 
to .. cave" the roof in the waste so no packs were built, but at the waste edge 
a line of steel rrame chocks, with mechanical releases, supplemented the wood 
props and bars. At the time of the explosion the face had travelled 37 yards. 
The only other coal producing workjngs in the district at the end of May 
were three duckbill headings, os. 2 1 ,  22 and 24, which were being driven for 
the purpose of opening out a longwall face to the nonh of the First West 
return airway. 
A road conveyor system, consisting of 30-inch belts, delivered all the coal to 
a central loading point on the West Level in the Main Coal Seam. The No. I 
trunk conveyor extended up the intake drift to the junction with the First West 
Belt Road where it was fed by No. 2 trunk conveyor, which extended the full 
lengLh of the First West Belt Road. Feeding on to this conveyor were the 
Second South and Third Soulh belt conveyors. a belt conveyor in No. 22 
heading and scraper chain conveyors in Nos. 21 and 24 headings. All were 
linked by a system of sequence control. 
The district was higllly mechanised, the whole of the cutting and part of the 
loading being done mechanically, and the whole of the coal being conveyed 
mechanically. AJI the plant was electrically driven. 
Normally, the longwaJI face was manned on the fore, back and stone-shifts 
and the duckbill headings on the back and night-shifts only. An average of 
some 325 tons output was obtained daily, half from the longwall face and half 
from the headings. 
As P3rt of the North Pit the district came under Mr. Emery's supervision. 
He wa:, assisted in this district by a fore-overman, a back-overman and a 
master <;hifrer, in addition to deputies and shot firers. 
Ventilation 
Ventilation was produced by a steam driven Walker" Indestructible" fan, 
22 feet in diameter. TItis fan was designed to pass 500,000 cubic feet per 
minute at six-inch water-gauge and at the time of the disaster was actually 
producing 423,000 cubic feel per minute at 5.5-inch water-gauge. An elec­
trically driven Sirocco fan, 133 inches in diameter and of similar characteristics, 
acted as a slandby. Both fans were situated on the surface and were connected 
by fan drifts LO both the South and the West shafts. 
The ventilation of this mine was complicated by the ract that a very long 
leg, extending seawards in the H utton Seam and through a fault into the Low 
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Main Seam to a total distance of four miles from the shafts, had la be balanced 
against the much nearer districts in the upper seams. As a consequence the 
air flow in these latter districts had to be closely regulatcd to ensure that 
sufficient ventilation reached the far under·sea workings. 
The system of ventilation of the Duckbill District itself is shown in Plan No. I .  
According to the last air measurements made before the disaster, those on 
16th May, a quantity of 23,200 cubic feet per minute was reaching the top of 
the intake drift. Of tills 7,700 cubic feet per minute travelled to the idle places 
in the Trurd West District. Quamities of 1 1 ,000 cubic feet per minute and 
3,900 cubic feet per minute passed along the Fir�t West Materials and Belt 
Roads respectively. A quantity of 5,500 cubic feet per minute was taken 
from these currents to ventilate the standing places in the Fir:::.! South District 
and trus passed through air crossings direct to the First \Vest Return. The 
Second South places were ventilated by a current of 4,300 cubic feet p�r minute 
passing inbye on the Materials Road and through two fans in parallcl to the 
heading faces. This current then returned to the West Materials Road and 
mOSt of it passed along the Third South Materials and Belt Roads to the long· 
wall face and outbye along the return. Some air may have reached the Third 
South intakes and the longwall face by passing along the \Vesl Materials Road 
and the extension of the Second South Materials Road to the \Vest Belt Road. 
O n  16th May the quantity reacillng the longwall face, where the ventilation 
was restricted by a fail, was 3,200 cubic feet per minute. 
At that time Nos. 2 1  and 22 headings were ventilated through a breeches 
tube by an auxiliary fan situated on the Belt Road. Alongside this fan there 
was a canvas door. 
Between 16lh May and the time of the disaster important changes occurred. 
The fall on the longwall face was cleared. The fan ventilating No;;. 2 1  and 22 
headings was transferred to No. 21 stenton and the door in the Belt RO.ld was 
tben removed. Farther along the Belt Road another fan was installed to 
ventilate No. 24 heading; up to the time of the disaster this had been run only 
intermittently. On 28th May a second fan was installed in No. 21 stenton, so 
that Nos. 2 1  and 22 were ventilated separately. 
Lighting 
Old ham Type G.W. Electric Cap Lamps were used throughout the mine. 
The flame safety lamps in general use by workmen as gas detectors were 
Patterson A.1. (magnetic lock) and Patterson A.3 (lead rivet lock), the latter 
being in process of conversion to the former type by the lamproom staff as 
and when the necessary parts became available. Ringrose CH4 lamps were 
available as automatic detectors but were not used. The officials were supplied 
with either Wolf Patterson (internal relighter) 7 R or Baby Wolf 7 R.M.B.S. 
flame safety lamps for gas testing. 
Precautions against Coal Dust 
The only means of dust suppression in  the district were sprays, not in any 
way enclosed, at the loading point and at three of the transfer points. It was 
said that each spray delivered about six gallons of water per hour. The 
suppression of dust by wet cutting and water infusion, which had been carried 
out satisfactorily in other parts of the mine, had not proceeded beyond experi­
mental stages in the DuckbiU District. The cleaning up of coal and coal dust 
and the spreading of stone dust were done partly by a stone dust team, which 
visited in turn all the districts of the mine, and partly by men regularly employed 
in the district. The team, under the charge of an official known <lS the stone 
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dust man, consisted of seven men and their duty was to clean the floor and 
sweep the girders and sides, filling the dust inlo tubs or sacks, and then 10 
apply stone dust. 
On the fore·shift a man was employed to clean the conveyor struclUres and 
to spread stone dust, and on the back·shift a man dusted the roads near the 
face. 
Or. the stone·shift eight to ten men were wholly emRloyed, and others spent 
part of their time, in clearing spiUage and stone dusting. They began at the 
loading point and at the several transfer points and worked towards each 
other. Spillage was also cleared by the men engaged at the loading point. The 
total quantity of stone dust supplied to the mine as a whole was 40 tons per 
month. 
The sampling of dust for the North Pit was done by onc man who was fully 
engaged on this work. He took 102 samples each week . • 
1lI.-NARRATIVE OF THE EXPLOSION 
General 
The explosion happened at 4.35 a.m. on Tuesday, 29th May. By a tragic 
trick of fate this was a time when there were two shifts of men in the district, 
38 belonging to the stone-shift and 43 to the fore·shift. Only one of these men 
was rescued alive, and he died of his injuries a few hours later. According to 
the medical evidence, all lhe others, mercifully, died almost immediately. 
The names of the victims are given in Appendix I and Plan No. 2 shows 
where the bodies were found. Two members of rescue teams lost their lives 
in the recovery operations and so in all 83 persons were killed in the disaster. 
None of the 895 persons at work in other parts of the mine was seriously 
affected. 
Discovery and_Preliminary Exploration 
We have unfortunately no direct evidence of wbat happened on the shift of 
the disaster. The men on the slOne·shift, who were due to leave the district 
at about 5.0 a.m., had been engaged in coal cutting on tbe retreating Jongwall 
face, in erecting permanent supports in the duckbill headings, in building an 
air crossing at No. 22 stenton and in stone dusting. The fore·shifl went 
underground at 3.30 a.m. and in the ordinary course of events the fillers would 
have arrived at the face before the explosion occurred. The fact that none had 
done so suggests that tbey had been kept back because tbe conditions on the Third 
South longwall race were not normal, but, whatever the reason, it does not seem 
to have given rise to any great alarm ror those outside the district received no 
appeal for help. The first intimation of disaster was a loud bang rollowed by 
a cloud of dust. 
Frank Leadbiuer, a shart wagon-way man, who was just outside the shaft· 
bottom stables, acted promptly and, though the dust was so thick that he could 
not see, led the men working with him to the shafl bottom, and within a rew 
minutes had telephoned a report to the undermanagcr, Mr. Emery, at his 
home. He then returned inbye to the West Main Curve and tried to get 
in touch with the Duckbill District by telephone, but getting no response 
telephoned a warning to the men at the South haulage junctions. Soon after 
he was joined by William Cook, fore·overman in the Seven Quarter and Old 
Five Quarter Districts, who had heard a sound like a heavy rall wben he v.as 
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in the Seven Quarter engine house and had come 500 yards through a truck 
cloud of dust to investigate. After hearing Leadbitter's story Cook telephoned 
to Mr. Hopkins, the manager, and arranged for the withdrawal of the men from 
the rest of the mine. Then very gallantly he and D. Smith, a head wagon-way 
man, went along the Main Coal West Haulage Road in an attempt to get to 
the Duckbill District. About half way to the main loading point they heard 
what they thought was another explosion and felt the air current reverse. 
Not unnaturally they started to go back but, as the ventilation soon resumed 
its normal course. turned again inbye. 
I am satisfied that what these two men thought was a second explosion was, 
in fact, an extension of a fall that they reached shortly afterwards. But I have 
no doubt at all that they believed it was an explosion and it is to their great 
credit that they went on in spite of what they must have felt about the risk of 
further explosions. About 150 yards from the loading point they came to 
a large fall and quite properly decided that it would be foolhardy to attempt 
to get over it by themselves. They therefore returned to report. and near the 
West Curve met the undermanager, Mr. Emery. 
Meanwhile. amongst other emergency measures taken on the surface, a caIl 
had been made on the Central Rescue Station at Houghton·le-Spring. At 
5.30 a.m. when the first team arrived underground they were sent almost 
immediately 10 examine the fall. Finding it impassable they returned and were 
sent to ex.plore the West Main Coal Return. It was, however, thought unlikely 
that rescue operations would be possible by this route and when Mr. Fry, the 
Area General Manager. arrived it was decided to employ colliery workmen to 
make a road through the fall with the utmost speed and to explore the airway 
from the Seven Quarter Second South District, for this connected with the 
Duckbill District return drift where it passed through the Seven Quarter Seam. 
Trus road proved to be quite travellable and though some props and doors 
had been blown out, Mr. Fry, Mr. Emery and Station Officer Adamson reached 
the Duckbill Drifts without much difficulty. Further progress was impossible 
without the use of rescue apparatus. The air was quite still, indicating that 
the air crossing at the foot of the intake drm had been damaged. The separa­
tion doors in the stenton connecting intake and return had been destroyed and 
the air was so foul with afterdamp that the canaries carried by the party were 
overcome almost immediately. 
Rescue and Recovery 
Clearly rescue operations had to be organised immediately to deal with a 
disaster of the first magnitude. Arrangements were made, therefore, to establish 
a fresh air base in the Second South Seven Quarter airway about 100 yards 
back from the Duckbill District return drift. This was by no means an ideal 
site, for materials had to be manhandled for considerable distances, both in 
getting them to the base and on to the place of use. However, there was no 
alternative until a travellable road could be made over the fall on the West 
Main Coal Level, and in spite of the difficulties the first team left the base 
(marked on Plan No. 2 as the First Fresh Air Base) just aner 8.0 a.rn. to explore 
out bye along the intake drift. Near the loading point they found a datal hand, 
Matthew Williams, alive but so badly injured that, as mentioned earlier, he 
died a few hours later. They saw the bodies of several other men and found 
that the air crossing had indeed been destroyed. 
This team and others following reported that the stoppings between intake 
and return had been destroyed over a large area. It was decided, therefore. 
to arrange for two teams to operate simultaneously. one sealing off at selected 
points to re-establish ventilation and the other extending to the utmost the 
9 
search for possible survivors. This arrangement worked weU for a time and 
one of the exploring teams penetrated to the end of the Straight North headings, 
a distance of about 1 , 100 yards. However, J. Y. Wallace, the captain of a 
colliery rescue team, lost his life in exploring in the First West roads, and 
it was then decided that the brigades were penetrating too far into the irrespirable 
atmosphere and, therefore, that both teams should be used to restore the 
ventilation. 
So far all the operations had been carried out from the original base in the 
Seven Quarter airway. By noon the next day, 30th May, after the ventilation 
bad been re-established in the drifts up to No. 2 stenlOn, the Training Section in 
the Main Coal Seam sealed off, and a road made over the fall on the \Vest 
Main Coal Level, the fresh air base was advanced to a point just oUlbye of 
No. 2 stenlon. 
By midnight the fresh air base had been advanced to No. 14  stenton on the 
First \Vest Materials Road, travelling being easier on this road than on the 
Belt Road. As no survivors had then been found and as samples of the atmo­
sphere brought back by the exploring teams were higllly lethal, it was agreed 
by all parties that there was no longer hope of finding anyone alive. 
Before any further advance could be made, it was necessary to increase the 
quantity of air reaching the fresh air base. The foul air in the First South 
District was sealed off and air crossings were erected to carry any seepage 
direct 10 the return. 
At this lime a co\ er base was set up at the First West Materials Road JUDction. 
This permitted adequate reserves to be kept close to the fresh air base and 
allowed oncoming brigades to rest before going forward for active duty. 
About 7.45 a.m. on 1st June, the fresh air base was moved in to No. 16 stenton 
and exploration along both bell and return roads reached No. 25 stenton. 
Some two hours later 1-1. Burdess, a member of a rescue brigade exploring the 
inbye end of the First West Roads, collapsed and died. At the time it was 
thought that he might have been affected by having to pass a number of dead 
bodie:;, and, though it slowed down the rate of advance, arrangements were 
made to bring out all the bodies on the line of travel. Further difficulty arose 
when it was found that the \Vest Materials Road was blocked by a Large fall 
ahead of No. 20 Slenton. To by·pass this, the fresh air base was transferred 
to the 13eh Road. 
On 2nd June the base was advanced to tbe junction of the Belt Road and the 
Third South Materials Road. Brigades erected stoppings at the entran:::e to 
the Second South Headings and built a tube air crossing over the Third South 
Matenals Road so as to convey any afterdamp seeping from this area into the 
return airway at No. 26 stenton. 
On 4th June the base was advanced to just outbye of the junction of the 
Third South Materials Road with No. 27 stenton ; more bodies were recovered 
and the Third South face was explored to where it was closed by a faU about 
1 7  yards from the conveyor gate. Both 27 and 28 stentons were also closed 
and though an attempt was made to clear a road through them, it soon became 
obviolls that little further progress could be made by men wearing apparatus. 
Colliery workmen were then brought in, but when afterdamp began to leaJ.. 
into the Materials Road at the tube air crossing it was decided to withdraw 
everybody and clear the afterdamp from the First and Second South areas. 
Teams re-ventilated these areas in turn and at 6 a.m. on 7th June it was possible 
to re-establish the base at No. 27 stenton. A way was made over the fall in 
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this stenton on 8th June but the air in  the return was found to be foul. How­
ever, when rescue men started clearing the fall in No. 28 stenton air began to 
drift over it. By 8.0 p.m. the ventilation was re-established and the whole of 
the Third South had been cleared of afterdamp. The rescue learns were then 
withdrawn to the out bye end of the First West Materials Road and from there 
they inspected the Straight Norrh and the Third West headings and found them 
clear. At 9.45 p.m. on 8th June, their task completed, they withdrew from the 
mme. 
The rescue operations covered a period of 257 hours, during which time 
1 1  officers, 48 permanent corps men and 291 trained colliery rescue workers 
were engaged. Between tbem, these men wore apparatus 1,168 times and 
13,277 pounds of liquid air was used. 
Later I shall have to make some comments on the circumstances connected 
with the deaths of J. Y. Wall ace and H. Burdess. In so far as I may appear to 
criticise, it will be solely in the hope that what I have to say will contribute to 
safety i n  future, and I wish to make clear beyond all question my great admira­
tion of the way in which the rescue teams worked. It may be that the tem­
peratures were not excessive nor travelling conditions unduly arduous, but 
the work was prolonged, the distances tra veiled considerable and the atmosphere 
so lethal that anyone making a mistake or taking a liberty was likely to pay 
for it with his life. Nevertheless, and in spite of the death of two of their 
comrades, these men never faltered and their morale th.roughout was main­
tained at a level that reflected the greatest credit on them as individuals and 
on the system in which they had been trained. 
Tribute must also be paid to the large number of colliery workers who man­
handled supplies to fresh air bases and with each move forward removed bodies, 
strengthened stoppings and cleared paths. Their work, tbough not so dangerous 
as that of the trained rescue teams, was arduous. unpleasant and nOl without 
strain, and 1 am glad to have the opportunity of recording sincere appreciation 
of their services. 
Investigation of the Affected Area 
(a) Method 
Investigation went on concurrently with the work of the rescue teams but it 
was not until 9th June that an inspection could be made of the whole of the 
area in the Five Quarter Seam. The Training Section in the Main Coal Seam 
remained sealed until the end of August. 
Immediately on returning from a tour of dUly, each rescue team made reports 
from which the surveying staff marked on plans the position of bodies and 
otber information. A staR' of surveyors and one or more of H.M. Inspectors 
of Mines were in  constant attendance at tbe fresh air base and they followed 
each advance as it was made, noting and marking on plans all signs of violence 
and of tbe passage of flame. Much of this information is shown on Plans 
2 and 3. 
A detailed examjnation of tbe area from the aspects of passage of flame, 
signs of coking and residual dust was made by Dr. Tideswell and his colleagues, 
Dr. Woodhead and Messrs. Shaw and Bradshaw, of tbe Safety in Mines 
Research Establishment. 
H.M. Inspectors of Mines collected samples of dust, in  the way prescribed 
by the Regulations, over the whole area affected. 
All electrical plant was examined on site as soon as practicable and all 
damaged or defective pieces of apparatus found were taken to the surface for 
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further examination and. where necessary. for test at the Slfety in Mines 
Research Establishment. ,\11 the conveyors were examlllcd for signs of heatin£ 
and all safety lamps found were collected and sent for test, as also were two 
pairs of chock releases found in the tripped condition. Thc five auxiliary fans 
were brought to the surface and examined by Mr. A. E. Crook. H.M. Principal 
Inspecror of Mechanical Engineering, and later by Mr. H. Robinson of the 
Safety in Mines Research Establishment. 
(b) Conditions 011 the Roads 
There was liule evidence of severe mechanical damage to the supports and 
structures on the road ways, but many support!> had been dislodged and roof 
falls were numerous and extensive. Examination of the supports remaining 
in positiun showed that the loads on them were by no means high, and it is 
probable that the falls were caused by the explosion pressure diSlodging lightly 
loaded props. There was evidence that some falls had occurred during the 
actual explosion; some had extended after the explosion., 
The bodies, except for five on, or in the vicinity of, the longwall face. were 
found at widely separated pans of the roads. Most of the fore-shift men 
were on the Third South Materials Road. 
(c) Conditions on the Lollgwall Face 
A very severe weight had occurred on the face which was closed by a fall of 
roof extending from some 12 yards to 27 yards from the intake and, except 
for a few yards at each end, the remainder of the roof was fractured and 
displaced (see the cross-sections on Plan No. 2). Many of the wood props 
and bars and many of the wood chock pieces were broken. Nine of the 
mechanical releases with which the chocks were equipped were found ,. tripped". 
A few feet behind the chocks the roof had fallen, mostly in large blocks. 10 a 
height locally at least tcn feet above Ille seam. 
The coal cutting machine was found about 12 yards from the return gale in 
circumstances which lefl little doubt that it was cutting whcn the explosion 
happened. The bodies of tbe three machine men were several yards nearer the 
return roadhead. The control handle was in the full .. on" position, the 
haulage and cutter chains were in gear and the kirvings were close up against 
the jib. An examination of the cable supplying the gate-end box showed that 
i t  had been damaged at a point near No. 27 stenton whilst live, the blow received 
causing a short circuil. In view of the violence needed to cause the damage 
found-the wire armouring had been pierced and brick dust was found even in 
the insulation of the cores-there can be little doubt that the cable must have 
been struck, whilst still passing current to the cutting machine. by 4 brick 
propeUed by Ihe blasl of Ihe explosion. 
The bodies of two stonemen were discovered at the face about 30 yards 
from the intake road and those of two others at the intake road head near that 
of the master shifler, J. Charlton, whose relighter flame safety lamp was found 
nearby. The flame safety lamp belonging to 1. Godsman, onc of the cutter 
men, was found in the Belt Road some distance back from the face. No 
flame safety lamp or other means of detecting firedamp was found on the face. 
(cl) Passage DJ Flame 
The spread of flame (see Plan No. 3) was exceptionally large, amounting to 
roughly 16,()(X) yards, though as Or. Tideswell stated, signs of severe burning 
were few and local. Indications of its passage were found in almost all parts 
of the Duckbill District and there was also evidence of flame in tbe Main Coal 
Workings 500 yards west of the foot of the Drift. On tbe West Main Haulage 
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Road flame travelled about 100 yards east of the foot of the Drift. No signs 
of flame were found in the Third South Materials Road south of No. 27 
stenlOn, the Third South Bell Road for 150 yards south of this stenton, and 
No. 29 heading. Plan No. 3 also shows where signs of coking were found. 
(e) Direction of Blasl 
There was general agreement on the direction of the main blast of the 
explosion. It was outbye on aU roads in the First \Vest area east of No. 21 
stenton and down to the West Level, except for the projection westwards along 
that road. The Second South, First South, Straight North and Third West 
areas aU showed directions of blast pointing from this main path. fo this 
path of the explosion from out bye of No. 18 stenton the blast traversed 
the intakes first and burst through the stoppings in the stentons towards the 
return. 
fnbye of No. 21 stenton the indications were less consistent. The two intakes 
of Third South showed a general blast towards the face, but in the return 
the direction of blast was out bye, except for a stretch between No. 26 and No. 27 
stentons and one near the face. In all the stentons inbye of No. 18, the blast 
was from the return towards the intake. I n  Nos. 21, 22 aDd 24 headings the 
explosion was towards the faces of the headings. At the junction of No. 22 
heading with the return, blast radiated in all directions. 
As is  usual after an explosion. everything was found to be covered with 
.. explosion" dust. which bad been raised up by the blast and had subsequently 
settled. This deposit, Dr. TidesweU stated, was of varying thickness and 
appearance but averaged 1/50 inch in thickness. Examination under the 
microscope showed that much of it  bad been subject to flame. Some 400 
samples of tltis dust were tested in the laboratory. Nearly 300 of these were 
grouped as being those least likely to have been contaminated with dust other 
than that which bad been raised in the explosion cloud, and with few exceptions 
they contained between 30 and 55 per cent. of incombustible math::r. 
Mr. W. J. Badger, H.M. District Inspector of Mines, sampling in accordance 
with the Regulations, collected 163 samples. Of the 28 samples taken in the 
Training Section of the Main Coal Seam 25 contained less than the minimum 
75 per cent. of incombustible matter required by the Regulations. Of the 
135 samples collected elsewher� in the affected area, 113 were found to be up 
to the required standard. 
IV.-CAUSE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXPLOSION 
Point of Origin 
In the light of the evidence it was agreed by all the panies concerned in 
the Inquiry that tbe point of origin of the explosion was at the retreating 
longwall face. There were otber places, such as the junction of No. 22 Duckbill 
heading with the return, at which the lines of force indicated a possible origin, 
but in none of these, in fact in no place other than the longwall face, was any 
possible igniting source found. 
Means of Ignition 
Although electricity was so widely used, the evidence showed that it was 
not the means of ignition. Though some damage and defects were discovered 
in the electrical plant, it was shown either that they had been caused by the 
explosion itself, or that they were in such a position that they could not have 
given rise to the explosion. 
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In a careful examination no contraband whatever was found. 
All mechanical appliances such as conveyors were examined but no signs 
of frictional heating sufficient to have served as a source of ignition were found. 
The position of tbe shot firing cables and exploders showed that no shots 
were being fired at the lime of the explosion. Evidence was given that sbots 
had been fired in the roof at the longwall face to release chocks on some 
previous shifLS and that on Sunday morning, 27th May, a shot hole was seen 
to have been bored for sucb a purpose, tbough it had not tben been charged. 
Mr. Emery. inspecting about 8.0 a.m. on the following day, formed the 
impression tbat a shot had been fired near a chock. It  seems to me unlikely, 
however, that if firedamp had been ignited by any such shot it would have 
continued to burn unseen when the heavy ralls of roof occurred in the waste 
during the drawing-off operations on the evening prior to the explosion. 
The safety lamps belonging to the men who were at or
1
near the face when 
the explosion bappened were found in a damaged condition, and there is of 
course no means of knowing what they were Like berorehand. But as they were 
all damaged, and as the general standard of maintenance of the lamps was very 
high, it is reasonable to assume that the damage had been caused by the 
explosion. 
There is the possibility that gas was ignited by sparks caused by rock falling 
in the waste, but no such sparks bad ever been reported and, in my view, it  is 
improbable that tbis did in fact happen. 
It  was proved that sparking did sometimes occur during the operation of the 
chock releases and a number of chock releases were found i n  the released state 
after the explosion, However, in tests made some years ago by the Safety in 
Mines Research Establishment on releasing ebocks under load in an explosive 
atmosphere, and recently repeated under much bigger loads using a pair of 
the chock rele..'lses discovered to have operated spontaneously on the longwall 
face, no cases of ignition of fuedamp occurred. 
On the other hand, the evidence is ilial the coal cutter picks were moving at 
the time of the explosion, that they were then cutting through pyrites, and 
that sparks from litis pyrites proved, under test by the Safety in Mines Research 
Establishment, readily capable of igloiting mixtures of firedamp and air, More­
over, sparking had frequently been seen i n  other districts of (he seam when a 
cutter jib was exposed during jibbing in, and on one occasion sparks had been 
�n in the undercut on this particular face. 
I IU1\"C no hcsit3tion, therefore, in finding that the ignition was due to sparks 
caused h) the ,,:ouner picks striking pyrites-a conclusion which was accepted 
by all the paTlh_'o n.:prc5cmcd at the Inquiry. 
Explosi,'c 1\1edium 
From the position of the igniting source as well as on general grounds, it 
was agreed by all parties that the initial explosion was one of firedamp. 
(a) Source 0/ Fir£'damp 
In considering lhe source of the firedamp, it is necessary to refer briefly to 
the roof conditions on this retreating race since it was started on 12th April. 
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After the face had travelled some 15  yards, that is to about 20 yards from the 
back rib side. some three to four feet thickness of roof fell in large pieces ia the 
waste. On 27th April a heavier weight occurred causing a further fall of large 
stones in  the waste and the breaking of many props at the face. After this, 
cutter breaks usually formed in  tJle roof along the successive face lines and 
the withdrawal of the supports became difficulr. On I hh May, when it had 
moved 32 yards, the whole of the face except near the ends was affected by a 
much heavier weight and len yards of it was closed. I n  the waste a considerable 
thickness of roof fell again, mostly as large stones. The face was not fully 
re-opened until 2 1 st May. From then up to the time of the explosion it 
advanced 41 yards. 
During coal filling operations on Monday, 28th May, breaks were observed 
in the roof at the face on the length of about 20 yards between the intake 
road head and a slip plane. During the day a break displacing the roof down­
wards on the goar side developed along the face on the return side of this slip. 
On the back-shift, after the loading of the web of coal had been completed, the 
chocks were advanced and props and bars withdrawn. This was followed by 
falls of roof in  the waste and by further displacement of roof along the break 
near the coal face, but about 8.0 p.m. the roof steadied and shonly afterwards 
the last of the back-shift workmen left the face feeling that it was quite secure. 
There is indirect evidence, however, that further trouble occurred during the 
night-shift. Usually cutting was completed between 2.0 a.m. and 3.0 a.m., 
but when the explosion occurred at 4.35 a.m. 1 2  yards remained to be cut. 
Moreover, though men normally working in the duckbill headings were some­
times sent to the face to load cuttings, the presence at or near the face of four 
stone-men and the master shifter, together with the fact that the fore·shifl 
workmen had not proceeded to the face, provides strong circumstantial evidence 
that the roof had again been •. on weight ". 
Considering the reasons for the occurrence of this weight, it seems to m� 
that as the face advanced, the roof over the waste, being withoul direct SUPPOfl, 
would be carried on abutments in the solid coal sides, in the coal left behind, 
aDd in the coal ahead of the face. With the continuing advance the span over 
the goaf and consequently the abutment pressures would increase and some roof 
beds would lower and fracture. An attempt to show the trend of these occur­
rences, though not the actual happenings, is made in  Diagram I .  
Although the immediate roof behind the waste edge supports collapsed in 
layers, the stone did not break up much in falling, and Mr. Emery, Mr. Hopkins 
and Mr. Morgan agreed, when questioned by Mr. Jones, that the conditions 
which developed were not those in which caving was likely to be successful. 
As the seam was nearly seven feet thick it seems evident that the heaps of 
debris cannot have been high enough to give support to the unbroken beds 
above tbem. 1 envisage, therefore, tbat even after the weighting of I 1  th May, 
a considerable cavity in the goaf area was spanned by the higher beds. 
It is likely therefore that during the night of tbe disaster the higher beds, over­
strained by their increasing span over the goaf and affected perhaps by the 
comparatively slow advance since 1 1  th May, and under the influence of the 
cut being made at the time, lowered gradually and finally fractured. Many 
props broke under the extra pressure and falls occurred, but most of the chocks 
remained effective and limited the extent of the falls. That the weight continued 
after the explosion is shown by the fact that some of the surfaces of the chock 
blocks exposed by fracturing were not coated with dust. 
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DIAGRAM I. 
(b) £missioll of Firedamp 
Whilst aU panies agreed that the firedamp came paTlly from the waste and 
partly from the higher beds, there was a wide difference of opinion as to the 
contribution made by each source. Mr. W. H. N. Carter, H.M. Senior In­
spector for Special Duties, thought that the firedamp had in the main come 
from cavities in the waste and that the emission was on the whole gradual. 
On the other hand, Mr. H. E. Collins, the Production Director of the Durham 
Division of the National Coal Board, and Mr. H. F. Wilson, H.M. Senior 
District Inspector of Mines in charge of the South Durham District, thought 
there had been a sudden and very large outburst from the roof strata. 
Considering the possibility of emission of firedamp from the waste, the space 
created by the removal of the coal was roughly 300 feet in length, 100 feel in 
width and six feet in height, that is about 1 80,000 cubic feet. Except in so 
far as this cavity had been reduced by the lowering of the roof strata massively, 
as opposed to the falling of the immediate roof which would merely transfer 
the space slightly upwards, it would remain open, a potential reservoir for 
firedamp, with a ready path to the air coursing the face. 
The only evidence of the emission of firedamp on the face before the 
explosion was a sample, containing 0.08 per cent. of methane, taken on 6th 
May ten yards from the return side of the longwall face, and the testimony of 
one man that one of the deputies lost in the disaster had found it at the edge 
of a break on an occasion during the week beginning 2 1 st May. Coal, however, 
usually emits firedamp most readily when subjected to extra pressure, and it 
was to be expected that the " make " would increase as the face advanced, 
and the extra pressure on the coal forming the margins of the excavation 
became of increasing consequence. On the First South longwall face firedamp 
had sometimes been found after a fall in the waste and it is probable that 
similar occurrences would have been observed on the Third South had it 
travelled a little farther. 
In any event, on retreating faces with solid sides there is no circulation of 
air across the waste area, which, as shown in Diagram 1 1 ,  is ventibted only 
at the edge adjoining the face working, so that even a small flow of firedamp 
into the waste leads in time to a rich mixture. 
If cavities are created in the waste area, a large accumulation may collect 
there, but, apart from an issue, roughly corresponding to the make, at the 
return end of the face, the firedamp may appear only as a result of ground 
movement within the waste area or of rapid changes of barometric pressure. 
On the assumption that the cavity in fact did contain a rich firedamp mixture, 
the effect of the lowering of the upper beds, which almost certainly took place 
during the night of 28/29 May, would be to cause the emission of a stream of 
firedamp near roof level at the return end of the face. As a consequence of 
the occasional falls that \\ere Likely to be taking place in the waste area, there 
would also be surges of firedamp. To these may well have been added some 
extra make from the coal forming the face as it came under increased pressure ; 
part of this would find its way into the air current via the undercut. 
It is quite probable that the movements and collapses in the waste would also 
create channels whereby firedamp from the thin seams 136-185 feet above the 
Five Quarter Seam may well have made a contribution to the emission. 1 reject, 
however, the view that a large outburst occurred suddenly, partly because a 
gradual issue fr0111 the waste is more in accord with general experience, hut 
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Spread of the Explosion 
Two widely differing views were put forward as to the reasons for the spread 
of the explosion outbye. Mr. CoWns contended that the large volume of 
firedamp under high pressure, which he envisaged to have been released when 
the waste collapsed, was practically simultaneously ignited and that it carried 
the explosion through the whole of the affected area, with coal dust playing 
but a minor part. On the other hand, Dr. Tideswell envisaged a gradual 
emission of firedamp causing a considerable length of the return airway to 
contain an explosive mixture ; when this was ignited it burst through into 
the First West intake roads and there initiated an explosion of coal dust which 
continued through the rest of the area. 
Mr. Collins based his opinion on five main factors :­
(I) The absence of excessive explosion violence. 
(2) The very light deposits of coke and the absence of coking over quite long 
lengths of roadways, particularly the outbye lengths of the First West 
Roadways. 
(3) The peculiar effects of the explosion in the Training District of the Main 
Coal Seam. (Here he was referring to the fact that there were signs of 
burning of props and braltice cloth i n  the Training Gallery although 
no evidence of burning was found in the roads leading to it.) 
(4) The uniformity with which the flame traversed the roadways throughout 
the New West Duckbill District and particularly the fact that these 
flames travelled along tbe returns. 
(5) The results of the analyses of the post-explosion residual gases and the 
deductions drawn therefrom. 
I see nothing in the first three factors at all peculiar to explosions of firedamp ; 
simHar effects have been noted in previous explosions which after full investiga­
tions have been accepted as explosions of coal dust. 
The uniformity with which the flame traversed the various roadways is, I 
think, what might well be expected, bearing in mind the very numerous con­
nections between intakes and returns and that, almost without exception, the 
stoppings in these connections were destroyed. 
The fifth factor refers to an attempt on the part of Dr. Jones, the Divisional 
Chief Scientific Adviser, to determine the nature of the fuel giving rise to the 
explosion from the composition of the residual gases. The method depends 
on the fact that when a fuel burns, the hydrogen combines with the oxygen 
in the air to form water, which condenses, so that it is possible from a com­
parison between the gaseous products of combustion and the amount of oxygen 
consumed to arrive at the proportions of hydrogen and carbon in the fuel. 
]n the laboratory this is a well established method of distinguishing between 
different hydrocarbons, but it has not previously been used as a means of 
determining the nature of the fuel taking part in an underground explosion. 
The method has possibilities, but as yet little is known about the variations 
resulting from the known instability of the oxides of carbon in a mine and 
from the absorption of oxygen by coal. Moreover, Or. Jones himself made it 
quite clear that any conclusions based on the analyses of residual gases were 
valid onJy for the area in which the samples were taken, that is inbye of the 
First South headings. 
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Mr. Collins, however, suggested that as the conditions out bye of First South 
differed in no material sense from those inbye it was reasonable to assume 
that there was no difference in the explosive medium. But in fact the conditions 
differed very significantly in that in all the stentons inbye of No. 18 the 
indications of direction of force pointed from the return towards the intake. 
whereas in  the stentons out bye from there the force had travelled from the 
intake towards the return. Mr. Collins thought that the explanation of this 
very important difference was partly that as the explosion travelled along two 
intake roads as compared with one return road, the force towards the return 
would be greater than I..hat away from it, and partly that the explosive violence 
which occurred at the junction of the return with No. 22 stenIon would tend to 
retard the explosion wave in its passage fan her out bye along the return. He 
said, however, at another point, that he was " definitely of the opinion that the 
initial explosion caused the falls in the face return, in stenton 28, and that it 
blew tbe stopping in stenton 27, the stopping in slenton 26, tlle doors in the 
extension of the Belt Road towards the return,1 and finally passed along the 
return towards 22's beading ". If, as Mr. Collins believed, the explosion was 
propagated by a fast moving column of firedamp with a burning front it  is 
surely to be expected that when the explosion blew through into the intake at 
No. 26 stenton and at the belt extension, the postulated elfect of the spread of 
the explosion along the twin intakes. as well as the " further development of 
explosive violence ". should have become evident there and the subsequent 
direction of force out bye of this point should bave been towards the return. 
But in fact the direction of force in the stentons inbye of No. 1 8  was from 
return to intake and the signs of explosive violence were at the junction of 
No. 22 and the return. I therefore reject his explanation of the change in 
direction of the blast. 
Finally. ] find it quite impossible to accept the mechanics of a theory by which 
in effect an atmost solid body of firedamp with a burning front propagated lhe 
explosion through the whole of the affected area by picking up oxygen as it 
advanced. This view is perhaps strengthened by Mr. Cotlins' replies to questions 
which I put to him :-
" Q. What volume and rate of emission of gas have you envisaged ? 
A. Well. J said earlier, Mr. Commissioner, that I agreed with Dr. Jones' 
estimation of 100,000 cubic feet. My own rough and ready estimation 
made it 120,000 cubic feet. 1 think this gas emission came off very, 
very quickly, and I can only say that I have no guide as to the rate of 
emission. J should imagine that the full emission was complete 
within a very few minutes. I cannot say any nearer than lhat, and 
that is merely an opinion. 
Q. r may be mistaken, I am speaking from memory. but I rather imagined 
that 100,000 cubic feet included his calculation for the area outside 2 1 .  
Is that correct ? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And that he was not prepared to hazard any opinion at all whelher 
it was firedamp or coat dust ? 
A. I think that was the position, yes. 
Q. To go back to this question of a large volume being produced in a 
very short time, would not that have produced a complete blanketing 
of the atmosphere which would indicate . . . .  ., 
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A. It would, except that, as I visualise the position, may I put it  this way. 
I think the source of ignition was there waiting for the gas to come off. 
I n other words, the coal cutter was cutting the whole time and the 
ignition of gas took place simultaneously, or roughly simultaneously, 
with the actual gas emission, and that the flame front went up in front 
of the main body of gas ; and that it got its feed of oxygen from various 
points en route." 
In my opinion even if such a process could continue. it  would be only by fits 
and starts, with interruptions whilst admixture with fresh air was taking place. 
There was, however, no suggestion that the men in the First West intakes and 
on and about the drift were taken other than unawares by the explosion and it 
is reasonable therefore to infer that the explosion swept through the workings 
without significant halt. 
On Dr. Tideswell's estimate that the flame reached the West level in the Main 
Coal Seam witrun 30 to 60 (or at most 90) seconds of being ignited, the outburst 
of gas postulated would have to be almost instantaneous and Mr. CoUins 
himself estimated that it  would be complete within a very few minutes. Assuming 
for the sake of argument, however, that it lasted five minutes and that the 
volume of air passing along the face was 5,000 cubic feet per minute, the atmo­
sphere would contain 80 per cent. of firedamp. Such a mixture could only 
ignite in the very small fraction of time taken for the thin envelope of mixture 
containing between five and 1 5  per cent. of methane, at the front edge of the 
rapidly advancing gas, to pass over the source of ignition. J am very doubtful 
if it could do so, but again assuming that, as Mr. Collins suggested, the fringe 
did manage to ignite, I cannot believe that it  would continue to burn. For at 
least the first 300 feet along the return this 80 per cent. mixture would have had 
to travel along a road in solid coal like a piston in a cylinder. As pure flI"edamp 
must be mixed with six times its own volume of air before it wiU burn, an 
80 per cent. mixture would need between four and five times its own volume. 
Thus for every unit of the mixture burned there would be nearly six units of 
incombustible products and, being hot, they would occupy at least 20 times the 
volume of the original firedamp. There being no means of escape, a rapidly 
increasing wad of incombustible gases would gather between the advancing 
firedamp and the only supply of fresh air. Very soon, indeed almost 
immediately, it would become impossible for enough gas or air to pass across 
this wad to provide an inflammable mixture and the flame would die for lack 
of oxygen. 
This analysis is, of course, quite unduly favourable to the hypothesis, for an 
emission of gas of 20,000 cubic feet per minute would have stopped the flow of 
air on to the face almost at once. In all probability the air would have been 
reversed and a part of the firedamp would have been forced into the intake 
roads where on the hypothesis it should have mixed with the air and burnt. 
In fact, as was brought out by Dr. Jones and Dr. Tideswell independently 
and supported by medical evidence, there was little, if any, combustion on 
the Third South intake roads near the face, and Or. lones gave evidence that 
little residual methane was found in these roadways as compared with else· 
where. 
It is now necessary to consider whether the facts can be explained on the 
alternative theory that an initial gas explosion burst through to the intake and 
caused an explosion of coal dust. 
Significant features of the initial explosion were the absence of flame i n  the 
intake in the neighbourhood of the longwall face, the development of violence 
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at No. 28 stenton, the direction of force being from return to intake as far as 
No. 18 stenton, and that the stopping in the extension of the return to the 
North Haulage Road was not destroyed. 
Or. Tideswell held that, to account for these features, at the time of the 
ignition fouUng of air must have extended well along the return but not beyond 
No. 1 8  stenIOn, and that near the source of ignition it must have been a slow 
burning mixture. Estimating that the volume of the air passing along the face 
was of the order of 5,000 cubic feet per minute. he calculated that to produce 
such an inflammable mixture flredamp must have been issuing from the waste 
for a period of from ten to 20 minutes. or more, and that the volume of firedamp 
needed would be between 5.000 and 20,000 cubic feet depending on whether or 
not coal dust played any part in this phase of the explosion. For convenience 
in this calculation Dr. Tideswell assumed a uniform emission. It is. however, 
unlikely that the emission was uniform and, as cJiffusion would be slow in the 
current moving slowly along the unobstructed return, I think the gas would 
tend to persist in layers and that the concentration would vary from place to 
place. Moreover, as the path of the explosion crossed the conveyors in Nos. 
24, 22 and 2 1  headings, it is reasonable to assume that coal dust did play 
some part in this phase. For these reasons. though the waste may well have 
contained a much larger volume of gas, J believe the effects observed may 
have been produced by a quantity approximating to the lower limit suggested. 
Against this it was argued that such a large volume of flIedamp could not 
have issued for so long without the three experienced machinemen working 
on the face becoming aware of it and taking some action. 1 believe the 
explanation is that :-
(a) as indicated in Diagram 1 1  most of the firedamp would issue from the 
waste near the return gate ; 
(b) the machine was still 12  yards from the return roadhead when the ex· 
plosion happened, and half an hour before, assuming normal cutting speed, 
it would have been 20 yards farther away ; and 
(cl the men had no means of detecting firedamp. 
The difficulty. ODe might say tbe impossibility, of accounting for the fact that 
the force of the explosion had travelled from the return towards the intake 
inbye of No. 18 and from the intake towards the return from there onwards, 
on the theory that firedamp was the sole explosive medium, has already been 
discussed. But if, as Dr. Tideswell suggested, a coal dust explosion travelling 
along the intake was initiated by the firedamp explosion when it blew through at 
No. 26 Menton and the extension of the West Belt Road, the difficulty disappears. 
Th� question then arises as to whether there was any evidence to support 
the theory of a coal dust explosion. 
Dr. 1 ideswcll estimated that there was a deposit of explo:.ioo dust-i.e. dust 
that had been r: lIsed into the air by the blast and subsequently deposited­
about one·fiflieth of an inch in thickness corresponding to a cloud density of 
about 0.5 ounce per cubic foot throughout the area. As tests by the Safety 
in Mines Research Establishment showed that coal dust from the Five Quaner 
Seam required 6Q..65 per cent. of inert matter to render it non-inflammable, 
whereas most of the samples of the explosion dust contained only 3S-SO per 
cent. of such matter, and as an explosion can be propagated by a cloud density 
of as Little as 0.05 ounce of coal dust per cubic fOOl, he expressed the opinion 
that there was between two and three times as much explosive dust as was 
necessary to have carried on an explosion. 
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Jt is true. 3S Mr. Collins pointed out. that the samples taken by the manage­
ment before the explosion and most of those taken by Mr. Badger afterwards 
contained considerably more than 65 per cent. of inert matter. and therefore 
it might seem that the dust should not have been explosive. These samples 
however were taken in the manner prescribed by the Regulations to determine 
tbe mean composition of tbe dust over the area of road sampled, whereas 
Dr. Tideswcll's survey showed that the composition of the explosion dust 
which, it must be remembered, was the dust which had formed the cloud 
through which the explosion had passed, was much closer to that of samples 
taken deliberately from the more coaly deposits. This is quite consistent 
with the work described in Safety in Mines Research Board Paper No. 105· 
which shows that mine dusts are not uniform and that the mean composition 
of non-uniform deposits seriously under-estimates the inflammability of the 
deposits. In short, a far higher proportion of inert matter is needed to render 
dust non-inflammable when the coal dust and the inert dust are not intimately 
mixed. 
Again, it  was argued on behalf of the National Coal Board that. because of 
the work done in cleaning up, there were good grounds for thinking that there 
would not be enough dust available to propagate an explosion. Having regard. 
however, to Dr. Tideswell's estimate of the amount of explosion dust, and to the 
evidence of Dr. Tideswell, Mr. D. E. Edwards. H.M. District Inspector of Mines, 
and Professor Granville Poote, lately Head of the Mining Department, King's 
College. Durham University, who was called as an expert witness by the 
National Union of Mineworkers, on the presence, particularly round transfer 
points, of deposits of coaty dust after the explosion. I am unable to accept 
this view. Despite the clearing up and stone dusting which had been done, 
the blast would raise coal-rich dust from any coal or cULLings in transit on the 
conveyors, from the conveyor structures-which are notoriously difficult to 
treat or clean-from the belts themselves and from inaccessible places behind 
supports, etc. 
It was said also that the amount of coking found in tbe area was smaU. and 
certainly much less than had been experienced at the Louisa ColJiery explosion 
in 1947, and that this indicated that coal dust had played little part. Deposits 
of coked dust were. however, found widely even though lightly distributed 
inbye the top of the drift from the Main Coal. Or. Tideswell held that the 
amount of plastered coke was about that usually found and that the amount 
and general appearance of the coked dust was consistent with an explosion 
travelling through a dilute and only moderately inflammable cloud of mixed coal 
and stone dust in air. Against this Mr. Collins contended that the coking nature 
of the Five Quarter Seam would account for the presence of signs of coking 
in the explosion dust even if the explosion was a pure firedamp explosion, i.e. 
that the propagation was not due to the inftammation of the dust itself. The fact 
is that it is not possible to say from a superficial examination of an affected road­
way whether an explosion had been one of coal dust or firedamp. Explosions of 
either give rise to widely differing degrees of violence ; a coal dust explosion 
may leave much or little coked dust ; and a firedamp explosion may produce 
coked dust that has played little part in the propagation of the explosion. 
One has to take into consideration the degree of probability of the presence of 
firedamp or of coat dust. [n this case, while [ see no likelihood of the presence 
of firedamp in these intake roads, I am entirely satisfied that there was enough 
inflammable dust to propagate an explosion. 
·The Prevention of Coal Dust Explosions. Part I. The Effect of Manner of Distribution 
or Stone Dust by S. Jones and F. V. TidesweU. 1947. 
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Summary of Conclusions as to Cause and Development of the Explosion 
Due to the thickness of the seam and to the fact that the roof caved in verv 
large blocks, cavities of considerable volume existed behind the longwall face. 
As the waste was not ventilated. a large volume of firedamp slowly accumulated. 
When the roof weight, itself a consequence of the incompleteness of the 
caving, began during the night of 28-29th May, firedamp in the waste area 
was pushed nearer to the face and began to be emitted into the air current at 
roof le\e1 near the return end of the face. Roof fractures extending upwards 
led to influx of firedamp from the upper strata. At least to the point where 
disturbance was created by the air leaking through the stentons, the firedamp 
largely remained as a layer near the roof. Probably within half an hour before 
the explosion the emission was intensified. Falls in the waste caused surges of 
firedamp which would tr..lvel along the return as gradually dispersing con­
centrations. 
Then, possibly not for the first time during the cutting operation, the cutler 
picks struck pyrites. The firedamp ignited by the -consequent sparks may 
have been pan of a surge from the waste. I tlunk it more probable that it was 
firedamp released into the undercut as a result of the weight. 
I believe that flame would emerge from the cut behind tbe machine and would 
alarm the machinemen who would naturally make for the adjacent road head 
without waiting to stop the machine. The flames, however, would lick towards 
the roof and there meet the under-surface of the flow from the waste. 
The inflammation probably proceeded quietly to No. 28 stenton where its 
contact with a more inflammable mixture created explosive violence. The 
explosion passed backwards towards the face and forwards along the return, 
where it blew through to the intake at No. 26 stenton and at the extension of the 
West Belt Road. 1L continued along the return bursling southward at suc­
cessive stentons to about No. 1 8  stenton. At No. 22 junction extra violence 
developed, possibly because the current then passing that point was highly 
inflammable. Thus into the lengths of the West Belt and Materials Roads 
between the Second South and Third South roads. where there were two double 
transfer points, flame came in two directions. I conclude that the explosion 
then became one of coal dust and that it spread as such, obtaining fucl mainly 
from the conveyors, the conveyor structures and the stentons. 
The reason for its providential cessation on the West Main Level is uncertain. 
Dr. Tideswcll suggested that it was �hecked because the oUlbye length of the 
fall on to this road had occurred before the flame reached that point. J[ may 
bc, however, that as this was not a conveyor road but was in regular use as a 
haulJ.g.! road, the coal dust and stone dust were more intimately mixed and 
therefore the stone dusting measures proved effective. 
V.-COMME TS ON THE CAUSE AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE 
EXPLOSION 
Firedamp 
(a) I"fluellcf.· of rile Mt·,hod of IVorking 
The choice of the method of working the longwall race, by rl!treJting, opening 
from a narrow heading, the roof i n  the wa�te being allowed to cave, was 
unfortunate. 
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If, as I believe, this led to the formation of large cavities in the waste in which 
firedamp accumulated and ultimately to tbe firedamp passing into the air 
current, it was a major cause of the disaster. 
It  is accepted mining practice that the beds overlying an area of goaf behind 
a longwall face shall be supported as soon as possible, either through packs or 
through heaps of caved debris. 
For c.'lYing to be successful certain conditions must be fulfilled. As it is 
important that these conditions should be clearly understood, r repeat the 
quotation by Mr. T. A. Jones from the Second Report of the Durham Falls of 
Ground Advisory Committee :-
.. Conditions essential for the success of the caving method are that :-
(I) the beds forming the roof for a certain distance above the seam must be 
of such a nature that they can be made to break on' clearly and fall 
regularly, each cut, when the back supports are withdrawn behind the 
face ; 
(2) these beds must be of such a nature that they become fragmented as they 
fall and thus occupy considerably more space after they have fallen 
than they did in their original stratified condition ; 
(3) the beds which fall must be of sufficient tltickness in relation to the thick­
ness of the seam worked so that the natural packs formed by the fallen 
material will be fairly tight to the first strong bed above those which 
fall." 
Both the regularity and the height of the fall depend not only on the nature 
or the strata but also on the efficiency of the waste edge support. Although 
the chocks used on the face proved sufficiently strong, the wood props, which 
broke when the weights occurred, were unsuitable for the circumstances that 
developed. 
rt may be that, as Mr. Fry suggested, fragmentation would have improved 
as the face advanced <lnd full abutment pressures were established, but it 
was agreed by all that the fragmentation had not been satisfactory up to the 
lime of the disaster. Thus, the caving did not achieve its purpose, cavities 
developed and excessive stresses \vere imposed on the strata ahead of the face 
and on the supports (Diagram I). 
Mr. Carter, discussing the importance of the roof support measures adopted 
in the early stages of a face advancing from the soLid, pointed out the great 
transition that occurs, in a few weeks, from the conditions of a narrow heading 
in which there is often practically no strata movement, to those of a longwall 
face which is itself in a parrly de-stressed zone but has a very high pressure zone 
ahead of it, a high pressure zone behind it, and the whole of the beds up to the 
surface in motion above it. During these vast alterations there are often 
periods in which the roof is easy to control but there is always a liability to 
sudden adjustments known as .. first weights " and H second weights ". 
Experience has shown that it is not inevitable that these major changes of 
stress lead to dislocations at the face. Adequate supports will often counter 
their effects. 
I therefore agree with the view expressed by Mr. Carter and Mr. Collins 
that strip packs shou!d have been built in the initial stages, and cannot do 
oetter than quote what Mr. Collins said in evidence :-
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.. I feel very strongly tbat where a 10ngwaU face is moving off from the 
solid, whether it be an advancing face or a retreating face, initially strip 
packing should be applied. By that means tbe necessary time, with safety, 
would be afforded to study the actual roof conditions on that particular face 
without having to rely on conditions applying in other parts of the pit. 
Therefore, even though it  is intended to practice the caving system I consider 
that it would be a desirable precaution to start the face with strip packing, 
gradually dropping out the packs as conditions show that the caving system 
was likely to be a success ". 
The management believed that they had had experience in situations 
sufficiently comparable with that of the Third South to justify the adoption 
of the method practised, but they had not in this area opened a longwall face 
from a narrow heading and I do not think they realised the difference this 
made. I feel too that the roof troubles that occurred were not given enough 
attention. Had they been studied sufficiently, particularly during the shift 
in which the supports were advanced, that is the shift in which the effects of 
loss of roof control are most apparent, the occasional firing of shots in order to 
release the chocks would, J think, have been discovered, and this would have 
focussed attention on the need for a change in the method of working. 
As a consequence of the incompleteness of the caving, considerable cavities 
must have existed in the goaf area. Because the face was retreating and had 
solid sides. there was not the ventilating pressure difference across the waste 
which, with leakage through the packs into the return, leads to the gradual 
release of firedamp from the waste of an advancing face. The emission of 
firedamp, although it was by no means rapid, would thus gradually fill the 
cavities to the point of overflowing, and the effect of the ventilating current 
would be, as shown in Diagram 1 1 ,  to conceal its existence. 
Thus, while the retreating system, with or without caving, has advantages, 
the risks peculiar to these methods and the conditions in which it is permissible 
to employ them must be clearly understood and the proper safeguards observed. 
To summarise my views on this aspect, I would say that unless the natural 
conditions are suitable and the support of the waste edge is effective, caving 
will not be successful, but will lead to heavy weights at the face and to large 
cavities being left in the waste. Particularly on retTeating faces tbe cavities 
are likely to fill with firedamp, and when weights ocellI or the barometric 
pressure falls, it will be forced out into the air current. Caving shouJd not, 
therefore, be practised unless the natural conditions and method of waste edge 
suppor( are such that the roof in the waste falls regularly to a sufficient height 
and i n  a suitably fragmented state. In most cases strip packs should be built 
in the initial stages of a face opening out from a narrow beading ; they can 
be dropped gradually if and as the conditions developing as the face retreats 
show that caving is likely to be successful. On retreating faces, there being a 
greater liability to sharp increases in rate of firedamp emission, the quantity 
of air provided should be greater than that necessary on advancing faces in 
otherwise similar conditions. Investigations should be made to discover the 
extent of such variation in rate of emission. 
Matters concerning tbe use of chocks call for brief comment. The firing 
of shots to release the chocks was a breach of the then ellisting rule 
in the Explosives in Coal Mines Order that, in mines where Permitted 
Explosives 3re required because of the possibility that inflammable gas may be 
present " . . .  no shot shouJd be fired in the roof of a longwall working between 
the coal face and the waste " without the written authority of the agent and the 
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manager. The firing of such shots is now prohibited in safety lamp mines by 
Article 35 of the new Order and relaxation can be granted only by the Chief 
Inspector of Mines or a Deputy Chief Inspector of Mines acting on his behalf. 
Several of the chock releases were found after the explosion to have tripped 
spontaneously and evidence was given that during a previous weight seLf­
tripping bad occurred . It was also said that sparks had been emitted when 
these releases had been operated under heavy load. The wide adoption of 
releases has enabled chocks to be built so as lO resist roof movements effectively, 
and this has without doubt played a considerable part in the reduction in the 
frequency of accidents from falls of ground. Moreover, [ appreciate that 
self-tripping of the releases is by no means common. It is nevertheless desirable 
that as forms of chock release free from this defect become available, they 
should be adopted. 
The problem of the ignition of firedamp by frictional sparking is now the 
subject of active investigation by a Joint Committee of the Ministry and the 
National Coal Board. Meanwhjle, in the present state of our knowledge it is 
necessary to avoid the possibility of sparking in the viciluty of firedamp, and 
where sparks are liable to be emitted on the release of chocks, or certain forms 
of prop, set at the waste edge, the releases should not be operated unless tests 
have been made with a flame safety lamp-particularly at the waste edge­
and these have not revealed the presence of firedamp. I also urge the develop­
ment and use of supports not liable to emit sparks on being released. 
(b) influence oJ the Ventilation 
According to the statutory measurements the average quantity of air reaching 
the top of the intake drift to the Duckbill District was of the order of 23,000 
cubic feet per minute. Let us consider what part of this was reaching the 
longwall face prior to the changes in the system of ventilation made within 
a few days of the explosion. It  is a reasonable assumption that the normal 
flow exceeded the 3,200 cubic feet per minute found in the last measurements 
made before the explosion, on 16th May, for at tbat time the face was partly 
closed by a fall. J believe that it would amount to some 6,000 cubic feet per 
minute, which is the rough average of earlier measurements. 
Although the normal yield of firedamp was low, accumulations of firedamp 
had been found in other parts of the district on several occasions. Often these 
were small, but a sudden large emission of firedamp from a fault side in the 
First South area was recorded. To quote Mr. Miron, the occurrence of fire­
damp " seems always to have been sporadic and unexpected ". Moreover, a 
point I have already considered, cavities were being formed behind the longwall 
face and were Likely to be filling with firedamp which might be forced out 3t 
any time. I conclude, therefore, that though this volume of air was adequate 
to dilute the quantity of firedamp normally appearing in the air current, 
insufficient account was taken of the possibility, indeed one might say the 
probability, of temporary increases in the emission. 
Was the quantity of air on the longwall face sufficient, judged by other 
standards ? The cross-sectional area at the face was of the order of 70 square 
feet and, assuming a quantity of 6,000 cubic feet per minute, the velocity would 
be about 85 feet per minute. 
Let me quote from the Third Report of the Research Commiuee of the 
Monmomhshire and South Wales Coalowners' Association entitled " A Study 
of the Physical Condition of Mine Air "-" The best conditions would appear 
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to exisl when air velocities are between 1 50-450 feet per minute. Tbese values 
are recommended for air having dry-bulb temperatures less than 75° F. Above 
75° F. a higher range of air velocities is required in order to produce the 
necessary cooling effect H. 1 appreciate that in  truck seams compliance with 
tbese figures would require quantities of air greater than those usually provided, 
but, taking this considered opinion in conjunction with the evidence tbat 
sometimes the deputies in charge Slopped the fan ventilating the headings and 
opened the adjacent door in order to clear shot firing fumes from the 10ngwaU 
face, I consider the volume of air passing along the face to have been below 
that required by good praclice. 
Shortly before tbe explosion a number of changes in tbe system were made­
a fan was introduced for No. 24 heading, the fan feeding Nos. 2 1  and 22 head­
ings, and the door associated with it, were removed from the Belt Road to No. 
2 1  stenton, and on 27th May a second fan was installed io  this 5teoton. Because 
the air taken by the fans passed direct from the headings into the return aDd 
was lost to the parent current, these changes must have substantially affected 
the quantity of air passing into the Third South face and it  is to be regretted 
that the measures prescribed in  the Coal Mines (Ventilation) General Regula­
tions, 1947, that a detcrmination of the firedamp content of the air current 
and a measurement of the quantity of air should be made as soon as practicable 
after the making of such alterations, were not observed. It is true that the 
interval between the last change and the occurrence of the explosion was shon, 
but changes in ventilating arrangements may produce serious consequences 
quickly, and so when such changes are made, the position should be kept 
under observation until conditions have become stable again. 
In the absence of such measurements of the air flow it is possible only to 
estimate very roughly an important figure-the quantity passing along the 
face at the time of the explosion. According to the statutory measurements, 
of the 23,CX>O cubic feet pcr minute already mentioned as reaching the top of 
the intake drift to the Duckbill District, rather more than 7,500 cubic feet per 
minute went to the Third West places and an average of some 6,000 cubic 
feet per minute to the First South places. There was available for the inbye 
cnd of the District-the Second South roads, with the two fans ventilating 
the heading ends, the longwall face and the three duckbill headings-some 
9,000 cubic feel per minutc. After 27th May. two and sometimes three auxiliary 
fans were drawing air away from the intakes to the duckbiU headings. The 
fans were each of a type rated by the makers as being capable of deliveries of 
3,400-4,000 cubic feet per minute with the lengths and diameter of tubing in 
use. The delivery tubes were said to be " snubbed H, by means of cord tied 
round the tube, to restrict the flow. The last recorded measurements of the 
quantity delivered, on 2 1st May, showed that the single fan then ventilating 
Nos. 21  and 22 headings was passing 3,800 cubic feet per minute. 
It  is difficult to avoid the conclusion that at the time of the explosion the 
rate of air flow on the longwall face must have been well below the figure of 
6,000 cubic feet per minute estimated to have been passing before the cbanges 
were made. 
There is so much unavoidable uncenainty ahoU( the rate of emission of 
firedamp immediately prior to the explosion Ihat it is Dot possible to say how 
a more ample supply of air would have affected subsequent events. It may be, 
howe\'er, that had the quantity been more in accordance with good practice, 
the firedamp explosion would not have extended far eoough along the return 
to blow through into the First West intake roads. 
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Of the use of the auxiliary fans, Mr. Ronald \ViUiams said in his closing 
speech :-
H From the evidence there can be no Question that the auxiliary fans 
were so situated that if they were running at the same time and to full capacity, 
they would exhaust the flow of air available at the face. Some attempt 
was made, J know, to reduce the pull of the fans by snubbing, but the mere 
fact that instructions were given to deal with this vitally important maller 
i n  this way is perhaps a more scathing comment on the ventilation methods 
employed than any words which 1 could use." 
These are severe strictures, but J am bound to agrce that they are not un· 
justified. 
As has already been said, with about 9,000 cubic feet per minute of air 
available, five auxiliary fans were installed on the intake side of the 10ngwaU 
face and three were so arranged that the air passing through them. after 
ventilating the headings, was delivered into the return. One of these three, 
it is true, only worked occasionally and all were regulated, but as the method 
of regulation consisted merely of a piece of cord tied round lJle air tubes, a 
burst air tube between the fan and the constriction or a chance blow which 
severed the cord, could have caused re·circulatiol1 or a parlial shOT! circuil. 
Other unsatisfactory features were ;-
(a) The practice, adopted in respect of the fan supplying Nos. 2 1  and 22 
beadings when i n  its original position on the Belt Road and of the two 
fans in Second South, of placing a canvas door across the road at the 
point where the fan stood. An auxiliary fan as normally worked draws 
only a moderate proportion-Professor Statham· recommends not more 
than 25 per cent.-of the air passing along the airway from which it 
takes its supply, the remainder passing on unimpeded. Though it is 
true that there were alternative paths for air to reach the 10ngwaU face, 
the doors placed at these fans constituted restrictions which, in my view, 
were undesirable. 
(b) The stopping of fans ventilating places in which firedamp was liable to 
accumulate. Evidence was given of an occasion in Second South when, 
following the stoppage of the fans and the opening of the doors, firedamp 
accumulated in the beadings. Obviously when the fans were restarted 
the gas must have been carried on to the longwall face. 
In some cases auxiliary fans should be kept running permanently in order 
10 comply with Section 29 of the Coal Mines Act, 1 9 1 1 .  whkh requires that 
" an adequate amount of ventilation shall be constantly produced in every 
mine to dilute and render harmless inflammable and noxious gases to such an 
extent that all shafts, roads, levels, stables and workings of the mine shall be 
in a fit state for working and passing therein n .  If, for any reason, such fans 
have to be stopped, there should be alternative arrangements providing a 
sufficient flow to prevent the accumulation of noxious or inflammable gas, 
even when work is nol proceeding in the place concerned. 
Generally, however, the starting and stopping of fans is to be deprecated 
as the resulting redistribution of ventilating pressure may produce effects 
over a considerable area. 
';'Transactions of the Institution of Mining Engineers, \'01. cm, page 348. 
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I think tbe reaSOD for these makeshift methods is to be found in Mr. Jones' 
examination of the Assistant Agent, Mr. H. E. Morgan ;-
" Q. When this longwaU face was won out, did you consider or discuss 
with anyone the question of the ventilation of the ventilating district 
inbye of First South ? • 
A. No, I do not think it was discussed individuaUy. 
Q. Did you realise that 'he opening of Third South facc would make a 
considerable change in that ventilating district ? 
A. That was overlooked, I think. 
Q. It was overlooked ? 
A. Definitely overlooked." 
No. 1 4  (5) of the Coal Mines (Ventilation) General Regulations, 1947, lays 
down that H in respect of any section of narrow or panel workings the ventilation 
of which involves the use of two or more auxiliary fans drawing air from the 
same air current, a plan shall be prepared showing the general system of 
ventilation and the directions and quantities of the air currents ; and a copy 
thereof, and of any subsequent plan showing any change in that system, shall 
be delivered as soon as practicable to the [nspector of the Division ". No such 
plan was sent to the Inspector following the opening of the Third South and 
the manager, in answer to Mr. Jones, said that he " did not consider it  a change". 
Whatever the legal position may be, there can be little doubt that had a plan 
even been prepared the potential danger in the arrangements would not have 
been overlooked. 
I recommend that all existing systems of ventilation employing multiple fans 
should be reviewed and new systems studied to ensure that :-
(i) the volume of air is Large enough not only to avoid the possibility of 
re�circulation i n  any place ventilated by an auxiliary fan, but also to 
provide for the adequate ventilation of all other working places ; 
(ii> no fan is stopped unless there is allernative means of providing adequate 
ventilation ; 
(iii) if it is necessary to regulate a fan, it shall be done in such a way as to 
prevent unauthorised or inadvertent alteration. 
(c) Ignition by Friclioflal Heating or Sparking 
It was clearly established by the evidence that sparks were produced by coal 
cutter picks in various parts of the Duckbill District. Most of the witnesses, 
it is true, referred to sparks produced in the headings by shortwall machines 
when jibbing in and unfortunately the men best qualified to speak of conditions 
on the longwall face were killed in the explosion. One of the mechanics, 
however, said that he had seen sparks in the undercut on this face and I see no 
reason to suppose that it was any different from other parts of the district in 
this respect. 
It has, of course, been known for many years that firedamp could be ignited 
by the action of coal cutter picks on pyrites and on cenain types of rock or 
inclusions containing quanz. I have purposely avoided using the word 
.. sparks " because with pyrites at least it would seem that ignition is not caused 
by tbe sparks themselves so mueb as by finely powdered pyrites dust which is 
heated by friction until it bursts into Oame. This distinction in the mechanism 
30 
of ignition is important because it accounts for the fact that blunt picks are 
more likely to cause ignition than sharp ones. 
Many of the men in the Duckbill District had seen sparking often and, as 
nothing untoward had occurred, they may have formed the impression that 
it was not dangerous. Indeed, as Mr. Miron said, some such impression 
appears to exist amongst mining people as a whole. But an analysis of all 
reported cases of ignitions of firedamp from 1937 to 1951 has shown that, 
excluding ignitions from naked lights, ooal cutter picks are second only to 
explosives as an igniting medium, 91  ignitions have been caused by cutter picks 
and 100 by explosives. It has not been possible to establish the number of 
cases in which pyrites was involved, but there is no doubt that they were many. 
Attempts have been made 10 reduce the risk by introducing an inhibitOl 
into the cut. Wet cutting, especially if the water passes through the jib so 
as to wet the picks as they are entering their cutting path, must have a sup· 
pressing and cooling effect, but it is not possible to say that it would always 
prevent ignitions. Carbon dioxide has been tried, but it is not eac;ily practicable 
to provide the volume necessary. Atomisers have been used, as Professor 
Poote stated in evidence, referring in particular to the successful results obtained 
with them by Mr. R. D. Beilby ·.  However, not enough is known about tbe 
incidence of fuedamp in the cut, thougb we do know that it may vary most 
widely in place and time on the same face, and there is much more to be learned 
of the action of suppressors. Following a recommendation by the Safety in 
Mines Research (Advisory) Board, a V-Iorking Party consisting of members 
of tbe Ministry of Fuel and Power and of the National Coal Board has been 
formed to investigate the problem. As hazards of ignition from friction are 
not confined to coal cutters, the terms of reference are ;-
.. To review the risk of firedamp ignitions by frictional sparking or frictional 
heating arising out of underground coalmining operations, with particular 
reference to coal cutters and stowing machines ; to recommend what hnes 
of investigation should be followed ; and to advise as expeditiously as possible 
on the steps which might be taken to remove or control this risk ". 
Pending the findings of the Working Party the following precautions should 
be taken :-
(i) Wherever coal cutters are in use or are to be used, a survey should be 
made for the purpose of selecting a cutting horizon, as far as is practic· 
able, clear of any material from which sparks may be struck. 
(ii) The general policy in gassy seams with no clear horizon should be to 
adopt one of the ahernatives to cutting. or to adopt measures such as 
stowage or draining of the wastes to prevent accumulation of firedamp 
at the waste edge. 
(iii) Every effort should be made to ensure that onJy sharp picks are used. 
(iv) Water hose with an ample supply of water should be provided within 
easy reach. 
(v) Having regard to the dust and sparking problems, it should be the general 
policy to avoid dry cutting. 
(cl) Firedamp Deleclors 
The Coal Mines General Regulations (Firedamp Detectors), 1939, require 
that firedamp detectors shall be provided at certain places and for ccrtain men. 
"Transactions of the Institution of Minin, Engineers, 1941, vol. C. palle 2 1 2. 
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In compliance with these Regulations the coal cutter men on the Third South 
face were provided with a detector in the form of a flame safety lamp. One 
of the other men working on the face at the time had also been supplied with 
a flame safety lamp although this was not required by the Regulations. Neither 
of these lamps was at the face when the explosion happened, both of them 
having been left in the intake. 
It is impossible to say whether the firedamp would have been detected iD 
time jf the lamps had been at the face, but the chance that it might have been 
was lost when they were left in the gate road. 
By and large, detectors are issued only to men working in places where 
firedamp may be a hazard ; if they are to be of any real value they should be 
kept constantly within sight. For this reason the Regulations prescribe that 
a man who is provided with a name safety lamp as a detector shall not have 
any other light, except with the written perrrussion of the manager. This 
permission is, however, usually given to men such as coal cutter operators 
wbo need a good light and the use of both hands. The detector lamp is then 
just one morc thing to carry and-buman nature being what it is-it is the first 
thing likely to be jettisoned. onfirmation of this, striking in its simpljcilY. 
came from one of tbe wilnesses-a duckbill operator-who with an admirable 
absence of equivocation said that if he had a lot to carry he sometimes left his 
safety lamp behind because it was the tlting most easily dispensed with. 
Evidence given by the lamp-man showed that the duckbill operator was not 
alone in these views, and I am afraid that they are not confined to EasingtoD 
nor to any one coalfield. 
The function of a firedamp detector is to give timely warning of the presence 
of firedamp. If it is left behind because it is a cumbersome extra for a heavily 
laden man, it will give no warning to anybody of anything. Properly used in 
the proper place it may be the means of saving many lives. It gives a chance 
and it is tragic if that chance is thrown away. Both men and officials have 
a duty to see that it is not thrown away and J appeal to the National Coal Board 
and the ational Union of Mineworkers to do everything in their power to 
ensure that that duty is discharged. 
At the same time J recommend that research should be undertaken to develop 
a combined cap lamp and detector. Accuracy within fine limits is not necessary, 
but it must be reliable, easy to wear and give a good light. Also I endorse 
the view of Mr. Robert Vates, H.M. Deputy Chief Inspector of Mines, in his 
report on the explosion at Eppleton Colliery, that there is need for a device 
which would automatically cut off the electric power in an atmosphere containing 
a pre-determined percentage of firedamp. 
Coal Dusl 
In view of tbe conclusion that the spread of the explosion was caused by 
coal dust, it is necessary to review the measures taken to meet the requirements 
of the General Regulations (precautions against Coal Dust) 1 939. 
(a) Method of Sampling 
AlI lhe sampling in the North Pit was done by one man. His method was to 
start at the outbye end of the district and to collect samples from the roof, 
floor and sides respectively of each consecutive length or zone of roadway 
whether the road was one used for the transport of coal, a materials road or an 
airway. As his monthly quota of samples for the DuckbiU District was 72, 
the maximum number of zones from which he could take samples was 24. and 
32 
as each zone was 176 yards long and as he continued to sample the same zones 
month after month, only a little over 4,200 yards of the 16,000 yards of roadway 
estimated to have been traversed by the flame had been sampled within the 
period of six months covered by the evidence. 
The Regulations require that all accessible roads must be systematically 
sampled. On roads used for the transport of coal and in return airways within 
200 yards of the face, it is laid down that the number of samples collected 
monthly shall not be fewer than in the proportion of ten per mile, except with 
the consent in writing of the Inspector or unless the natural conditions ensure 
compliance with the Regulations. For other roads the requirements are less 
specific, but as it is provided that a road may be sampled at intervals not exceed­
ing three months if it has been shown that the application of stone dust is not 
required more than once in six months, the inference is that without such 
evidence the intervals should be considerably less than three months. 
It  is also laid down that " if since a sample was last collected over such a 
section of road, some pal1 of that section has been treated with incombustible 
dust more frequently or more recently than other parts, separate samples shall 
be collected over the several pans irrespective of their lengths H. This clearly 
indicates that in the vicinity of transfer and loading points, where, according to 
the evidence, stone dusting was done much more frequenlly than elsewhere, 
samples should have been taken over lengths shorter than 50 yards. 
Sampling in itself cannot, of course, make a pit safe-it is only a meaDS to 
an end-but it is an essential part of any system of dust control. It is disturbing 
therefore to find that it was carried out with so little understanding and that 
roads could remain unsampled for so long without the higher officials becoming 
aware of it. The sampler said in evidence, and it was nOt refuted, that he had 
continued the method of sampling used by his predecessor. the only person 
from whom he had received any instruction in his duties. He admitted that 
he had never drawn attention to the fact that parts of the road ways were not 
being sampled ; on the other hand, his superiors seem to have concerned 
themselves only with observing whether the incombustible contents of the 
samples taken were within the proper limits. 
(b) Suppressiol/, Removal al/d Trealmelll 
For the suppression of dust the management relied on the use of water 
sprays at the transfer points-wet cutting and water infusion having been 
abandoned after short trials. Sprays when used in conjunction with some form 
of enclosure so designed that the dust is driven on to smooth surfaces to which 
it adheres, and from which it is subsequently collected in such a way as to prevent 
its escape into the air, are effective. With sprays used as at Easington the wet 
dust particles settle on the roof, floor and sides and subsequently dry out. 
Evidence was given that on the stone-shift from eight to ten men were wholly 
engaged in cleaning up spillage and stone dusting, and up to 1 8  men were so 
employed for part of the shift. In addition there was a man on the fore-shift 
who cleaned up and stone dusted the trays of the conveyors. It  is right and 
proper that spillage should be cleaned up, but the amount of spiUage must have 
been excessive to necessitate the employment of so many men and more attention 
should have been given to its prevention. The spillage was loaded on to the 
belts and thence into tubs and, though it was wetted, a great deal of dust would 
be raised into the air during both operations ; some would stick to the belts 
and, as it dried out, would be deposited over the whole length of the conveyor 
structure. 
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The local application of SlOne dust at transfer and loader points was carried 
out by the men who cleaned up spiUage. There was also a man on the back­
shift who stone dusted the roads near the face. What was described as 
the strategic stone dusting of the mine was carried out by a team of seven men 
under a leader known as the stone dust man. According to this man it took 
three to four weeks to stone dust the Duckbill District and it was re-treated 
about every four weeks. It is difficult to reconcile this with the needs of other 
parts of the mine, but as no written records were kept the position remains 
obscure. He admitted, however, that no stone dusting had been done in  the 
Third West since it was finished and that he left the stone dusting in the Main 
Coal Training District to the people in charge of training. 
There was, however. evidence which r accept, that beginning on the 16th 
April, the intake roads in Third South were stone dusted right up to the face 
and that the Third South Return between the face and the First West Materials 
Road was treated during the week before the explosion. Indeed, most of the 
team were still engaged in the District and were killed in the explosion. 
A1though he kept in  touch with the sampler and re-treated any zone from 
which an adverse sample had been taken, the stone dust man otherwise used 
his own judgment as lO where and what treatment was required. 
(c) Gel/eral 
Almost haphazard as the sampling and stone dusting may have been, it 
must be noted that the incombustible contents of the samples taken before 
lhe explosion were wetl above that required by statute, and it  may be that had 
samples been taken in  other lengths of road which had been stone dusted in 
the same way. similar results would have been obtained. The results of the 
samples taken after the explosion by Mr. Badger tend to confirm this view. 
Excluding the Main Coal Training Area where. as J have already menlioned, 
the treatment was left to those in charge of training, 1 13 out of 135 samples 
contained more than 75 per cent. of incombustible matter. and Mr. Collins 
quite properly pointed out that the average incombustible content. including 
the samples from the Training Gallery, was 75 per cent. 
Mr. Badger's samples were taken in the manner prescribed in the Regulations 
and, as was pointed out in the Inquiry into the explosion at VaUeyfield Colliery 
in 1939,· samples taken in this way do, viewed as a whole, give a rough guide 
to the general composition of the road dust as determined in a similar way 
before the explosion. Moreover, in explosions in which the stone dust and the 
coal dust have been intimately mixed the composition of the dust, as determined 
by such samples, has nol differed greatly from the composition of special 
samples taken to include as far as possible only dust which had been in the 
explosion cloud. The wide difference in the results of the two types of samples 
in this explosion-it will be remembered that Dr. TidesweU gave the incom­
bustible content of a large majority of the samples of the explosion dust as 
between 30 per cent. and 55 per cent.-is quile consistent with the theory that 
the explosion was propagated on its main path by coal-rich dust from transfer 
points. from the structure of the conveyors. from the belts, including any coal 
in transit, and to some extent from the stentons. 
Before 1 continue with this main problem-coal dust in conveyor roads­
I should deal with the spread of the explosion off its main path . 
.. Report on the Causes of, aDd Circumstances attendmg, the Explosion which occurred on 
the 28th October, 1939, at Vallcyfield Colliery, Culross. Fife. Cmd. 6226. 
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The spread of the explosion off its main path to the faces of the Straight 
North and Third West places and elsewhere was mainly due to coal dust picked 
up from disused roadways. Such roads, unless they are sealed off, tend slowly 
to accumulate airborne dust and if they are driven, as these roads were, in the 
seam, they accumulate coal dust through spaUing of the sides. 
Mr. Robert Yates, H.M. Deputy Chief Inspector of Mines, found that coal 
dust deposited in disused roads conlributed to the explosions at Murton · 
and Louisat Collieries. As Mr. Yatcs said, if and so long as such roads are 
accessible they should be treated fully in accordance with the Regulations. 
Otherwise they should be sealed off permanently or special measures of protec­
tion should be arranged at the mouths of any inaccessible places-for instance 
by shelf barriers or an arrangement of walls with a sandwich of stone dust. 
Clearly. the existence of passages in \\hich fine coal dust may accumulate 
and which are open to any explosion lhat may occur in the workings defeats 
care taken in maintaining the working roads in satisfactory condition. This 
matter is of particular significance in County Durham where, as Mr. Yates 
pointed out, disused roads abound in bord and pillar mining. 
The sources of the coal dust i n  the main path of the explosion were mainly 
peculiar to conveyor roadways. Attention was drawn to the importance of 
this problem in the Report: of the Royal Commission on SafelY i n  Coal Mines 
published in 1938. The Commissioners foresaw that the importance of the 
problem would grow as the use of conveyors became more extensive. Tragic 
confirmation of this view has been afforded by this explosion and those wltich 
occurred at Whitehaven WilJiam and Louisa Collieries in 1 947. Additionally, 
the numbers of fires which have been caused by conveyors, culminating in the 
disaster at Creswell Colliery i n  1950, leave no doubt about the degree of risk 
attending their use. 
The time has come to take stock of the position. 
(d) What am be done ? 
Transport by road conveyors has its ad\<antages, but there is reason to believe 
that there is an optimum length beyond which the method becomes uneconomic. 
I was, moreover, surprised to find at Easington that there were so many men 
engaged primarily on cleaning spillage. The installation and maintenance 
costs of the additional safeguards against fire and explosion, which bitter 
experience has shown to be essential, will not J think be light. Thus it may 
well be that in many instances the economic advantages of road conveyors will 
disappear entirely. J have no doubt that all these matters will be subject to 
fresh review by the National Coal Board and it is possible that the use of long 
roadway conveyors may tend to decrease, but even so the hazard would diminish 
only gradually over a considerable number of years and a more immediate 
remedy must be sought. 
The Royal Commission proposed that a Joinl Committee should be set up 
by the then Mines Department to work out appropriate methods of dust 
prevention and collection on conveyor roads. Such a Committee was ap­
pointed and did some preliminary work but, owing to the outbreak of war, 
it was allowed to lapse. 1n the meantime these problems have received a good 
• Report on thc Cau5cs Ilr, and Circum!>tances attendtng, the Explosion which occurred 
on lhc 26th June, 1942. at the MUllon Colliery, Durh.tm. Cmd. 6413. 
tRcport 011 the Cau!>cs of, ;lnJ Cir(umst.mcc.s >iltem.ling, the Explosion which occurred ut 
Louis.t lindudmg Morrison Old) Colliery, Durham, on the 22nd August, 1947. Cmd. 7374. 
!Report of the Roy .. l Comrnis:'lon on SJfety in Coal Mines. 1938. Cmd. 5890. 
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deal of attention. Particularly as a result of the work carried out to limit 
airborne dust because of its effect on health, there has been a realisation that 
effective dust prevention and suppression at the working face can reduce the 
rate of dust deposition on conveyor road ways. But the problems are by no 
means solved and 1 therefore revive the Royal Commission's suggestion i n  a 
somewhm amended form by recommending that a Committee should be 
appointed, representing the various interests. to investigate the use of road· 
way conveyors with a view to determining the limits within which they may be 
safely and advantageously employed. 
In the meantime everything possible should be done to accelerate progress 
in the direction of preventing the formation of dust, and of suppressing such 
dust as is unavoidably produced, as close to the point of production as is 
practicable. 
The progress should, of course, start at the coal face by such measures as 
improved roof control; by a reduction i n  shot firing ; and, where appropriate, 
by waler infusion and by wet cutting, supplemented with spraying where 
necessary. 
The conventional type of coal cutter, in addition to its liability to produce 
dangerolls sparks, a matter with which I have dealt, is by its design a make( of 
dust. At present there is no universally practicable alternative to its use, but 
there are a number of promising lines of investigation. Onc of these arises 
from the fact that in some places where wJ.ter infusion has been adopted, the 
coal has been found to work so much more easily that the use of coal cutters 
has been discarded. So far it has been considered possible to adopt water 
infusion only where the natural conditions have been particularly favourable, 
but I believe that the technique can be developed so as greatly to increase the 
range of these conditions. For example, seams which cannot be infused by a 
steady hydraulic pressure might behave quite differently jf a shock wave could 
be sent through the water column. Another possibility is the development 
of machines operated by slow moving forces as, for instance, the coal plough. 
Here again existing machines of this type have had only a limited success in 
this country, but it should not be beyond the wit of man to overcome their 
limitations. 
I therefore recommend that investigation should be undertaken (a) with a 
view to extending the range of applicability of water infusion and to developing 
its possibilities for working coal, and (b) to hasten the development of coal 
gelling and loading machines operated by slow moving forces. 
During transport, dust is both produced and released into the air wherever 
the coal falls freely. Every practicable measure should therefore be taken to 
eliminate spillage and to reduce to the minimum the height of the free faU in 
the transfer of the coal from conveyor to conveyor or from conveyor to tub. 
Both can be reduced by the use of properly designed chutes . .  Far too often 
conveyors deliver OD to other conveyors moving at right angles without any 
provision to bring about a smooth change in the direction of motion of the 
coal. And here I would call attention to a most useful paper by Mr. 1. V. 
Spence, ODe of H.M. Inspectors of Mines.· 
Some spillage at loading points may be unavoidable and arrangements should 
therefore be made for it 10 fall into hoppers containing water or fitted with 
sprays, from which it may be subsequently loaded out without releasing dust 
into the air. Provision should also be made to clean and collect the dust 
from the surface of the return belt. 
.Tronsactions of the Institution of Mming Engineers, 1951, vol. ex, page 313. 
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Even where these precautions have been taken, it may stiU be necessary to 
make provision for the suppression of dust raised into the air at transfer and 
loading points. As I have already mentioned, sprays are not effective unless 
steps are taken to confine and collect the weued dust particles. Complete 
enclosure is not essential. All that is required is that the dust particles shall be 
driven on to surfaces to which tbey will adhere and from which they can 
subsequently be collected. 
Measures based on these general principles will, if thoroughly carried out, 
effect a material reduction in the quantity of dust deposited on the roof, floor 
and sides of roadways. They will not, however, prevent it entirely and it 
remains to consider further measures to deal with the residue. The need for 
regular and thorough cleaning and for the application of stone dust 011 the 
., little and often " principle is well known. Attention should, however, be 
given to the way in which the cleaning is done-shovelling dust and spillage on 
to a conveyor belt or into tubs merely results in moving the finer and more 
dangerous dust from one place to another. Experiments with a form of vacuum 
cleaner originated jointly by the National Coal Board and H.M. Inspectors will. 
if successful, go a long way towards a solution of this problem. 1n the mean­
time, when cleaning is being done, the dust and small spillage should be well 
wetted and loaded carefully into bags for transport to the surface. eedless 
to say, when a place has been cleaned it should be re-stone dusted immediately. 
As has already been pointed out, one of the factors tending to increase the 
dust hazard on conveyor roads is that the stone dust and the coal dust are not 
intimately mixed. The " little and often ,. principle attempts to overcome this 
but even if stone dusting is done several times during a working shift, it does 
not produce a reatty intimate mixture of coal and stone dust. To some extent 
at least this could be overcome by a device which puffs out small quantities of 
stone dust automatically throughout the shift. This is not a new idea but it 
has never found favour because it may cause discomfort and inconvenience to 
workers by increasing the total amount of dust in the air. If, however, the 
amount of coal dust is kept down to the practicable minimum the quantity of 
stone dust needed would not be excessive. In any event it is a method which 
might be worth a trial at transfer and loading points. 
When all these measures have been taken there will still remain the problem 
created by the ease with which coal dust can be raised by the blast of an 
explosion from the conveyor structure and from the belts. The only practicable 
solution at present in sight seems to be the provision of some form of dust or 
water barrier at suitably chosen sites. There is still much to learn about 
barriers, but experience in Germany with dust barriers of the shelf type has been 
sufficiently favourable to justify their adoption in tltis country until somet.hing 
better is devised. Research'should be carried out in the further use of dust 
barriers and in the development of water barriers, and in the meantime shelf 
type barriers should be installed on conveyor roads. 
As regards sampling, J have already pointed out that the present statutory 
procedure was designed to show the average composition of the dust. On 
travelling and rope haulage roads, where the dust on the Hoor is mixed and raised 
by the passage of traffic, the composition as so determined would not in general 
differ greatly from the composition of the dust cloud raised by an explosion. 
and the prescribed standards of incombustible matter provide a reasonable 
safeguard against continued propagation. It is clear, however, that these 
results are not achieved in the very different circumstances produced by conveyor 
transport. Unfortunately, until more is known about the rate of deposition 
of coal dust at different places and under dif ering conditions, it is impossible 
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to prescribe either appropriate standards or methods of sampling by which to 
ascertain whether they are being observed. I recommend therefore that (a) tests 
should be made under actual working conditions to determine the rate of dust 
deposition primarily but not solely on conveyor roadways, and (b) experiments 
should be carried out for the purpose of evolving an improved sampling 
tcchnique. 
Here it seems appropriate to say that no sampling procedure can be effective 
unless the object is clearly understood and the method is applied conscientiously 
and with intelligence. It was probably with something of this in mind that 
Professor Poole suggested in evidence that sampling should be .. placed 
completely in the hands of the scientific staff of the National Coal Board ". 
I am in sympathy with the idea behind this suggestion, but if it were carried 
out it seems to me that it might create a situation similar to that which led the 
Lord Justice General, in his judgment on the appeal of tbe Crown in the 
Knockshinnoch Castle Colliery proceedings, to say " What was everybody's 
business was nobody's business ". The scientific staff would not be responsible 
in law and the manager could not be held responsible in justice. This is, of 
course, an instance of the general problem-the problem of the responsibility 
of specialists in the industry. Fortunately there is, 1 think, a solution in this 
particular case which in no way encroaches on the responsibility of the manager. 
Merely as a matter of common prudence colliery managements should consult 
the scientific staff about the organisation of their sampling and stone dusting 
arrangements. Colliery dust samplers and men i n  charge of stone dusting 
should be given a course of training under the supervision of the scientific staff 
and should work as a team and to a plan under responsible supervision. From 
time to time the management should call on the scientific service to make check 
surveys and to advise on precautions desirable at special points. In addition, 
as frequent sampling and quick results are vastly more important than high 
degrees of accuracy. the assessment of samples should be speeded up by the 
more widespread introduction of optical methods. I recommend accordingly. 
What must be exercising the minds of many who read this Report is the fact 
that in spite of the labour expended on cleaning up coal dust and laying stone 
dust, and although the sampling done before the disaster showed the presence 
of high percentages of incombustible mall er, yel, according to the findings, 
a coal dust explosion occurred. Though they may accept the criticism of the 
way in which the operations were performed. they may nevertheless feel a 
loss of confidence in stone dusting and cleaning up as safeguards. That more 
must be done I have already said, but j trust that nobody will think that tbese 
measures are valueless. They have stopped the spread of a number of 
explosions and though many good lives were lost at Easington, if the 
roads had not been stone dusted the explosion might have acquired such violence 
that it would have spread far beyond its actual confines and cau cd one of the 
greatest disasters in mining history. 
Casualties to Rescue Workers 
John Young Wallace, a fully trained rescue man of 26 and an overman at 
Easington, was acting as the captain of a rescue team when he met his death. 
About half an hour after leaving the fresh air base the team was exploring the 
West Materials Road i n  the neighbourhood of No. 10 stenton when, without 
any previous signal of distress, Wallace sank to his knees, said a few words 
from the side of his mouth about sweating, sat down and then fell over uncon­
scious. Probably he died almost at once as his jaw would sag when he lost 
consciousness and the lethal external atmosphere leaking past the mouth piece 
would prove fatal within a few moments. 
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Apparently the team had been walking rather more quickly than is usual or 
prudent in rescue operations and they had had to negotiate a number of 
obstructions, but they had travelled only about 700 yards from the base and 
no other member of the team was distressed. 
According to the evidence, when Wallace collapsed his mouth-piece and nose 
clip were in place ; air was flowing normally into the breath..ing bag from the 
liquid air pack ; and he had not previously spoken. 
Subsequently the Ministry's Rescue Apparatus Testing Officer, Mr. J W. 
Calder. one of H.M.  Senior District Inspectors of Mines, examined and tested 
the apparatus in the manner prescribed for the approval of rescue apparatus 
and found it to be in order. 
Nevertheless. WaUace undoubtedly died from carbon monoxide poisoning 
and it  is therefore necessary to try to find how it got into his system. Post­
mortem examination revealed in both lungs a degree of emphysema sutlicient 
to cause breathlessness on heavy physical exertion, especially if such exertion 
were undertaken whilst wearing self-contained breathing apparatus under 
conditions of both mental and physical stress. In answer to questions by 
Mr. T. A. Jones and myself, Or. W. C. Sharp, H.M. Medical Inspector of Mines, 
expressed the opinion that as a consequence of his exertions Wallace might 
have experienced sufficient difficulty in breathing to cause an involuntary 
opening of the mouth ; that this would allow the outside atmosphere to leak 
past the mouth-piece ; and thal with the high concentration of carbon monoxide 
existing-probably of the order of three per cent.-even a slight leakage would 
induce a sufficient quantity into the breathing circuit to cause him to collapse. 
This appears to be the most Hkely explanation of what happened. 
Three days after the death of WaUace, H. Burdess, a trained rescue man, died 
in somewhat similar circumstances. 
About 35 minutes after leaving the fresh air base, Burdess signalled to his 
captain that he was in distress. His breathing bag was inHated and functioning 
normally and his nose-clip and mouth-piece were in place. Although the team 
had only travelled between 600-700 yards and the other members were quite 
cool and comfortable. he was sweating heavily. His captain and another man 
tried to help him out but after going ten to 1 2  yards he collapsed. Eventually 
he was carried out on a stretcher, but on arrival at the fresh air base was found 
to be dead. 
Examination and tests of the apparatus carried out by Mr. Calder showed 
that the automatic relief valve was set at 2.6 inches water-gauge instead of 3.5 
inches water-gauge, and that one of the teeth grips of the mouth-piece was torn. 
Otherwise the apparatus was �n order. 
The effect of the relief valve being set al 2.6 inches water-gauge would be to 
bring down the volume of air in the breathing bag to rather less than the six 
litres normally held when the valve is set at 3.5 inches. This, however, should 
nOl have had any adverse effect as the quantity of air produced by the Aerophor 
apparatus is much in excess of that normally required ; to quote Mr. Calder. 
" 1 would not expect it to affect a man's breath..ing in any way other than to 
reduce the resistance against breathing ". As regards the torn teeth grip, 
it is impossible to say when the damage took place. It  may have happened 
before or after Burdess collapsed, but in any event I do not think it had any 
particular significance. This view was confirmed in part at least when the 
apparatus, re-charged but otherwise as it was taken from Burdess' body, 
successfully passed one test i n  which the wearer walked for two hours at four 
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miles per hour and a second lest of two bours in which various operations 
were carried out in an irrespirable atmosphere. 
Thus again the question arises as to bow the carbon monoxide was inhaled 
and once more I think the explanation is provided by the post-mortem evidence. 
A condition known as bullous emphysema (distension of air sacs to blister like 
formations on the surface of the lungs) was found at the post-mortem examina­
tion. One butla, or blister, on the left lung had ruptured, permitting air from 
within the lung to pass into the chest cavity and so causing a partial collapse 
of the lung. Dr. Sharp explained that when the bulla burst it would produce 
" reasonably acute pain " accompanied by violent efforts to breath and that, 
as with Wallace, leakage of air past the mouth-piece might then occur. 
I f  these explanations of the way in which these two men met their deaths are 
correct-as 1 believe tJ1CY are-the question arises as to whether the physical 
defects from which they were suffering could or should have been discovered. 
Under the Coal Mines General Regulations (Rescue) 1928 rescue workers 
(a) are examined every 1 2  months by a qualified medical practitioner i n  accord­
ance with specified rules, and (b) when engaged in actual rescue operations are 
examined by a qmllified medical practitioner before undertaking a second spell 
of work. No rules are laid down for the way in which the latter examination 
shall be carried out. 
I understand that the degree or emphysema found post-mortem in \Vallace's 
lungs would have been extremely difficult to detect during Life by ordinary 
examination methods, and it is, of course, possible that the condition had 
developed in the interval between the time of his last annual examination 
and the date of his death. It is unlikely that it  would have been detected in 
the course of the less exhaustive medical examination that it is possible to make 
during emergency operations. \VaUace was a member of one of the earlier 
rescue teams and he was not medically examined before going on the spell of 
duty that ended in his death. L.:'lter, arrangements were made for the medical 
examination of all rescue men, whether on their first or subsequent speLls. This 
practice should be made general fonhwith. In the early stages of a disaster 
when minutes may make the difference between saving and losing lives, it 
would of course be quite wrong to hold back rescue workers until they are 
medically examined. As soon as conditions permit, however, they should be 
medically examined before they undertake any duty requiring the use of 
apparatus, as was done at Easington. Furthermore, 1 recommend that they 
should be examined medically at six-monthly intervals and that the most careful 
inquiry should be made regarding any illness which may have occurred between 
one examination and another. 
The case of Burdess is somewhat similar except that he was medically 
examined before starting on the spell of duty-his first-during which be died. 
This serves to emphasise the difficulty in diagnosing a moderate degree of 
emphysema by ordinary routine examination. Mine rescue work imposes both 
mental and physical strain upon those engaged in it  and it is desirable, therefore, 
that the requirements regarding the medical examination of rescue workers 
should be reviewed in order to ensure that only Iho e attaining a high degree 
of fitness are selected. 
Although there is no reason to suppose that it  had any bearing on his death, 
it  was brought out i n  the evidence that Burdess had been at the colliery for 
about eleven hours. It is true that suitable provisions were made for the 
comfort of the men who were standing by, but I suggest that wherever possible 
they should be allowed to remain at home on call until they are needed. 
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I sincerely trust that the deaths of these two men and any comments which 
I may have made will not impair confidence in existing rescue apparatus. 1t is 
true that the two main types of apparatus now in general use can be improved ; 
for example, they can be reduced in weight and it should be possible to evolve 
a better form of mouth-piece or a mask. 1 am glad to be able to say that 
measures have already been taken by the Ministry and the National Coal Board 
to ensure that these and other improvements are effected and that new types 
are developed. Let there be no mistake however-rescue apparatus in its 
existing form has stood the test of time and has enabled magnificent work to 
be accomplished with remarkably few failures. Given a proper understanding 
of its limitations, attention to detail and strict discipline, it will still do so. 
Management of the Colliery 
The Inquiry brought to light a number of bad practices and even direct 
contraventions of the Act and Regulations not causally connected with the 
explosion. They must nevertheless be considered in forming an opinion of 
the way in which the colliery was managed. 
It was admitted that the provisions of the Explosives in Coal Mines Order 
were not complied with in that some at least of the deputies had not been 
instructed as lO the maximum number of shots they were permitted to fire in 
any one hour or any one shift. Moreover, no tests had been made since 1948 
to determine the time required to fire a shot. 
The same Order was contravened in spirit at least by the practice of allowing 
the deputies to take into the mine more detonators than they required for use 
in their own districts in order that they could fire shots in other districts. 
After tbe disaster I 1  pounds of explosives were found buried under dirt in 
No. 21 heading. It must have taken some time for such a quantity to be 
accumulated and, evidently, not only was there a breach of the provision of the 
Order requiring that any explosive unused at the end of a shift should be 
brought out of the mine, but also the methods of control must have been woe­
fuUy defective. 
Evidence was given by two deputies that they had neither been given a copy 
of the Explosives in Coal Mines Order, 1948, nor had they been informed of 
the prohibition of the firing of shots i n  the roof at a longwall face other than 
with the permission in writing of the agent and manager. As 1 have already 
mentioned, there was evidence tbat on several occasions shots had been fired 
in the roor at tbe face for the purpose of releasing very tight chocks. The 
agent and manager denied any knowledge of the practice. The under-manager 
said that it came to his notice only the day before the ex.plosion and that he 
immediately gave orders for it to cease. Although I accept the word of these 
officials, the fact that this method of releasing tight chocks remained undetected 
is a reflection on the value of the supervision exercised. 
As regards matters other than shot firing. there was evidence that auxiliary 
fans had been started by unauthorised persons contrary to the requirements of 
the Coal Mines (Ventilation) General Regulations, 1947 ; the stoppings between 
the main intake and return airways in the Duckbill District did not conform 
with the requirements of General Regula!ion 91  ; a man in charge of an electric 
drilling machine had not been provided with a firedamp detector as required 
by the Regulations ; and on one occasion electrical apparatus which had been 
removed and re-erected in a new position had not been tested. 
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Singly some of these matters might not be of great moment. Collectively 
and taken in conjunction with unsatisfactory features discussed in earlier pans 
of this Repon, they indicate a disquieting lack of control and direction. 
I n his closing address Mr. Ronald Wiltiams said, h We have or had a situation 
prior to the explosion completely inconsistent with good management H. 
Mr. Williams made it clear that he was not referring to a particular individuaJ 
but to all who were re ponsible for the management side of we colliery, aDd 
later added, .. I cast no doubts about the sincerity and good intentions of the 
men concerned, but I do say that in the organisation at the managerial level at 
this colliery there were grave defects which have been shown i n  the evidence­
and these defects are very closely related to the causes of this explosion ". 
This is a not unjust summjng up. 
The officials who gave evidence impressed me as being hard working and 
conscientious men but they seemed to lack that ability to anticipate events 
and that comprehensive knowledge of what was happening at the coUiery which 
is characteristic of good management. I n the main this seemed to me to be 
due to weaknesses in the organisation. The manager appeared to be so fuUy 
occupied himself in day to day details of administration that he was unable to 
ex.ercise effective supervision and direction of the mine as a whole. Still less 
had he time to think out all the possible consequences of a major change of 
policy such as the decision to adopt longwall retreating with full caving in a 
district originally planned to be worked by other methods. 
Because of their duties in connection with the two other large mines in the 
group under their charge, the activities of the agent and his assistant were too 
widely dispersed to permit of their giving any effective help and guidance to the 
manager or, indeed, to allow them to gain the close knowledge of the conditions 
at the colliery which would have enabled them to do so. 
In short, nobody seemed to be in a position eiLher to see the situation as 
a whole or to think it out if he did. 
It  is not within my province to deal with the managerial organisation in 
general, but, in so far as I believe it to have a bearing on the disaster, it seems 
to me that in this panicular instance there were good grounds for the appoint­
ment of a full time agent. 
On the planning of the Duckbill District there was evidence that full use was 
made of the specialist consultant services and that, before it was decided to 
adopt 10ngwaIJ retreating, consultation took place right up to Divisional level. 
I am, however, left in some doubt about the value of consultations which did 
not make provision for the particular difficulties in roof control likely to be 
encountered when opening out on the caving system from a narrow heading in 
a virgin area, and which overlooked the ventilation problem resulting from 
the change. 
I n  his submission on this subject, Mr. Miron said, •• It seems clear that in 
this case. when the decision was first taken in 1947 to plan this entire district 
as a duckbill district, there was adequate consultation and avail made of those 
services at Divisional level. Subsequently the what I might call detailed day 
to day operations in the development of particular faces and changes of work 
at different points must be left to those on the spot, and it  would not be good 
organisation to do otherwise. 
[ hope from my questioning of Mr. Fry I made clear to you, Sir, the posit�on 
of the Area General Manager. He is in effect the Chairman or the ManagIng 
Director of his Area, and be is responsible for the co-ordination of all the 
Area activities. ]n the same way as at Divisional level so are there available 
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to him a certain number of specialist or consultant advisers. I would ask you 
to accept on that point that the organisation of the planning of this work was 
adequately carried out. that the subsequent development of the district and 
the working of this face was undertaken by those whose duty it was to do 
such work without reference to oLher people ", 
I cannot accept the implication that the original planners escape all responsi. 
bility no matter how unworkable their plans prove to be, and that the man 
on the spot must be responsible for all the possible consequences of the changes 
which he has to make in order to make the plan workable. 
Far be it from me 10 suggest undue interference with the man on the spot, 
but if the plann.ing of a colliery is not to be left in the hands of the officials 
with the direct responsibility of management-and that may be unavoidable in 
a nationalised industry where the working of a coalfield may have to be planned 
as a whole-those directing the planning must surely accept their share of 
responsibility, At the same time tbe colliery management has an equal 
responsibility for keeping the planning organisation informed of changes either 
in the plan or in the working conditions. To define precisely the duties and 
responsibilities of the various officials is by no means easy. However, I 
am able to report that the legal position in regard to this and other problems 
connected with the status and responsibilities of various specialist and other 




general results of the investigaLion, it is in my opinion 
( I )  The initial cause of the explosion was an ignition of firedamp on the 
Third South longwall face caused by the friction of coal cutter picks on 
pyrites. 
(2) The main issue of firedamp was from an accumulation in large cavities 
in the waste behind the 10ng'lYall face and that it was forced out during 
a roof weight. 
(3) The firedamp accumulated because cavities were left when the roof in the 
waste failed to cave satisfactorily. and as the face was retreating and 
had solid sides, there was not the ventilating pressure difference across 
the waste which, with leakage through the packs into the return. leads 
to the gradual drainage of firedamp rrom the waste of an advancing face. 
(4) 1n tbe existing conditions adequate caving was unlikely to occur in the 
early stages of a face opening from a narrow heading and strip packs 
should have been built until the roof was caving satisfactorily. 
(5) Due consideration was- not given to the risk of firedamp accumulation 
and of roof weight when deciding on the method of work. 
(6) Whilst the explosion was of firedamp up to the point at which it blew 
through into the intakes at the connections with the First West Materials 
and Belt Roads, it was thereafter continued by coal dust. 
(7) The coal dust was mainly derived from the conveyor belt and structures, 
from the vicinity of the transfer points and from the stemons, 
(8) There were defects in the system of dust sampling and in the measures 
taken to prevent, suppress and treat coal dust. 
(9) Insufficient consideration had been given to the system of ventilation, 
particularly in regard to the use of the auxiliary fans. 
(10) As a result of weaknesses in the organisation, there was a lack of effective 
supervision and control. 
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VIJ.-SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
( I )  Caving should not be practised unless the natural conditions and the 
method of waste edge support are such that the roof in the waste falls 
regularly to a sufficient height and in a suitably fragmented state. 
(2) All existing systems of ventilation employing multiple fans should be 
reviewed and new systems studied to ensure that :-
(a) the volume of air circulating is large enough not only to avoid the 
possibility of re-circulation in any place ventilated by an auxiliary 
fan, but also to provide for the adequate ventilation of all other 
working places ; 
(b) no fan is stopped unless there is alternative means of providing 
adequate ventilation ; and 
(c) jf it is necessary to regulate a fan it shall be done in such a way as 
to prevent unauthorised or inadvertent alteration. 
(3) The emission of firedamp from wastes of retreating faces and means 
of draining firedamp therefrom should be investigated. 
(4) All parties concerned should co-operate to ensure the proper use of 
firedamp detectors. Also an attempt should be made to develop a 
combined cap lamp and gas detector that is reliable, gives a good light 




Pending the findings of the Working Party the following precautions 
should be taken ;-
(a) Wherever coal cutters are in use or are 10 be used, a survey should 
be made for the purpose of selecting a cutting horizon, as far as 
is practicable, clear of any material from which sparh.s may be 
struck. 
(b) The general policy in gassy seams with no clear horizon should be 
to adopt one of the alternatives to cutting or to adopt measures 
such as stowage or draining of the wastes 10 prevent accumulation 
of firedamp at the waste edge. 
(c) Steps should be taken to ensure that only sharp picks are used. 
(d) Water hose with an ample supply of water should be provided 
within easy reach. 
(e) Having regard to the dust and sparking dangers, it should be the 
general policy to avoid dry cutting. 
Everything possible should be done to accelerate progress in the direction 
of preventing the formation of dust and of suppressing such dust as 
is unavoidably produced as close to the point of production as is praclic­
able. In particular investigations should be undertaken (a) with a 
view to extending the applicability of water infusion and to developing 
its possibilities for working coat, and (b) to hasten the development of 
coal getting and loading machines operated by slow moving forces. 
A Committee representing the various interests should be appointed to 
investigate the use of roadway conveyors with a view to determinjng 
the limits within which they may be safely and advantageously 
employed. 
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(8) Research should be expedited on the use aDd development of improved 
types of dust barriers and water barriers. In the meantime shelf type 
dust barriers should be installed on conveyor roads. 
(9) Tests should be made to determine the rates of dust deposition in road­
ways, and experiments should be carried out for the purpose of evolving 
an improved sampling technique. 
( 1 0) Colliery managements should consult the scientific staff about the 
organisation of their sampling and stone dusting arrangements ; colliery 
dust samplers and men in charge of stone dusting should be given a 
course of training under the supervision of the scientific staff, and 
should work as a team and to a plan under responsible supervision. 
From time to time the management should call upon the scientific 
service to make check surveys and 10 advise on precautions desirable 
at special points. 
(1 1) The assessment of dust samples should be speeded up by the more 
widespread introduction of optical methods. 
(12) The requirements regarding the medical examination of rescue workcls 
should be reviewed. 
Those recommendations on which prompt action is possible have been 
discussed with the National Coal Board, and I am glad to report that appro­
priate action has been initiated. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
I wish to express my sincere appreciation for the help and co-operation of 
the representatives of all parties to the I nquiry and of Mr. H. Offord, Clerk 
of Court. 
I am particularly indebted to Mr. T. A. Jones, H.M. Divisional Inspector of 
Mines, and his staff ; to Mr. A. H. A. Wynn, Director of the Safety in Mines 
Research Establishment, and his staff ; and to Mr. W. H. N. Carter, H.M. 
Senior Inspector of Mines for Special Duties, for his help in the preparation of 
this Report. I thank also Mr. W. D. Dobson, Chief Surveyor of No. 3 Area, 
Durham Division of the National Coal Board, and the surveyors and draughts-, 
men for the excellent plans prepared by them. 
I have the honour to be, Sir, 
Your obedient Servant, 
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LIST OF WITNESSES 
Name Occupatio" 
I .  Dobson. William Donald Area Chief Surveyor 
2. Ruell, David Arthur Area Chief Scientist 
3.  Kears. Leslie Datal Worker 
4. Leadbitter, Francis . . . Wagonwayman 
5.  Cook. WiJfred Bowman Fore·Overman 
6. Bellis, Tom Whomslcy Deputy 
7. Wright, Arthur Edward Robson . . .  Stone Work Instructor 
8. Jot'moon, lames . . .  Arcwall Man 
9. Gourlay. Alexander eormack Power House Attendant 
10. Fry, Francis Wilfred Area General Manager 
1 1 . Twist, Henry . . .  Superintendent, Central Rescue Station 
12.  Donkin, Thomas . . .  Mining Student 
13.  Davison, William Deputy Overman 
14. Caldcr, lames William H.M. Senior District Inspector of Mines 
1 5. Sharp. William C1arke H.M. Medical Inspector of Mines 
16. Wharton. Richard Duckbill Operator 
17.  Johnson, Slcphen Dominic Conveyor Puller 
18.  Coils, Ernest Conveyor Pullcr 
19. Jones, Thomas ' "  Hewer 
20. Ayre, Joscph Duckbill Operator 
2 1 .  Shipley, Ernest William . . . Hewer 
22. Brown, Sidney Lawrence Duckbill Operator 
23. Whilfield, John Patrick . . .  Duckbill Operator 
24. Anderson, Bcnjamin Cummlngs . . .  Duckbill Operator 
25. Chapman, George WiJliam Sloneman 
26. Harle, John Stoneman 
27. Mortimer, Georgc Wardle Pipe Filter 
28. Burnhopc, John Slonedust Man 
29. Graham. Joseph Collings . . .  . . .  Dust Sampler 
30. Crouch, Robert Edward Fitter 
3 1 .  TalC, Stanley . . . Mechanisation Overman 
32. Kell, Thomas William Underground Charge Electrician 
33. Lawson, Richard . . .  Electrician 
34. BlackwelJ, Frank Electrician 
35. Carter, Joseph Atbcrt . . .  Electrician 
36. Adamson, James George Bowman Electrician in Charge 
37. Wardlc, Burton . . .  Police Sergeant 
38. Smith, Joscph Cope . . . Head Lampman 
39. Gilmore, Owen Deputy 
40. ScUff, John Joseph Deputy 
4 1 .  Hully. Moses Stoncman 
42. Bartholomew, Joseph Arthur Deputy 
43. Keers. Thomas . .  . . . . . . .  Deputy 
44. Huggins, William .. .  . .  . . .  . Deputy 
45. Ruthcrford, George Parker . . . Bargainman 
46. Foster, William . . .  Deputy 
47. Wilson, Thomas . . .  . . . Deputy 
48. Liddte, Joseph . . . . . . . .  . Deputy 
49. Leighton. Edward . . . Chief Practical Instructor 
50. Whitfield, David Dixon . . .  Back Overman 
5 1 .  Barker, Robcrt . . . . . .  Back Overman 
52. Cramond, John . . . . .  . Back Overman 
53. Cornish, Robert William . .  . Overman 
54. Emery, Hugh Edmund . . . Undermanager 
55. Edwards, David Elwyn . .  . . .  . H.M. District Inspector of Mines 
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56. Hopkins, Thomas . .  
57. Morgan, Harold Eustace 
58. Sneddon, Thomas Nelson 
59. Gascoigne, Errington 
60. Dobson, Robert 
6 1 .  Davie, Duncan 
62. lohnston, Albert 
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65. Robinson, Henry . 
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67. Wilson, Harold Frederick 
68. Boam, William Arthur 
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n .  Collins, lames Whitelaw . 
73. Jones, John Henry 
74. Collins, Henry Edward 
75. Poole, Granville 
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Manager 
Assistant Mining Agent 
Mining Agent 
Area Safety Engineer 
H.M. Senior Electrical Lnspector of Mines 
H.M. District Inspector of Mines 
H.M. Electrical Inspector of Mines 
H.M. Electrical Inspector of Mines 
Chief Testing Officer 
Principal Scientific Officer 
H.M. Medical Inspector of Mines 
H.M. Senior District Inspector of Mines 
H.M. Inspector of Mines 
H.M. District Inspector of Mines 
Senior Principal Scientific Officer 
H.M. Senior Inspector for Special Duties 
H.M. District Inspector of Mines 
Scientific Adviser 
Divisional Production Director 
Professor of Mining 
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